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of the countries considered by organised criminal groups);
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drawing up the questionnaires sent through Interpol to the
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- transformed the information gathered by the questionnaires
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The work of writing this final report was carried out as follows.
TRANSCRIME conceptualised, organised and wrote a draft
report, which was discussed in Brussels on 5 October 1999 at a
meeting between the three research institutions and the European
Commission, the Council of the European Union and other
experts in the field.
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CERTI and the Erasmus University, the final recommendations
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Alessandro Scartezzini. This report has been sent for approval to
the participating Institutes and to the General Consultant.
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3. Executive summary This report presents the results of research conducted as part of
the Project "EUROSHORE. Protecting the EU financial system from
the exploitation of financial centres and offshore facilities by organised crime"
awarded by the European Commission under Programme
Falcone 1998 and carried out by TRANSCRIME, Research
Centre of the University of Trento (Italy) in co-operation with
CERTI – University Bocconi (Italy) and the Faculty of Law,
Erasmus University of Rotterdam (The Netherlands). The project
proposal was prepared in August 1998, following
Recommendation no. 30 of the EU Action Plan against organised
crime of April 1997. In implementation of this recommendation,
Member States "should examine how to take action and provide
adequate defences against the use by organised crime of financial
centres and offshore facilities, in particular when they are located
in places subject to their jurisdiction. With respect to those
located elsewhere, the Council should develop a common policy,
consistent with the policy conducted by Member States internally,
with a view to prevent the use thereof by criminal organisations
operating within the Union". The aim of the research reported
here was to foster the development of the promising path of
‘organised crime prevention’ that the European Union has
undertaken with its Action Plan and the Forum “Towards a
European Strategy to Prevent Organised Crime” held in the Hague
on 4-5 November 1999. Its rationale is that there is a broad area of
regulatory measures that could be used to hamper the growth of
organised crime. This action, if properly pursued, would be less
costly and more effective in terms of reducing the amount of
organised crime than crime control action alone, with which,
however, it should be combined. Acting on the regulation of the
markets infiltrated and exploited by organised crime requires
understanding and explanation of why and how the demand of
organised crime is matched by opportunities which facilitate its
development. The policy implications of this understanding
should be  a re-regulation of the mechanisms that produce such
opportunities.
The existence of under-regulated and non co-operative financial
centres and offshore jurisdictions is the cause of serious concern
for international efforts to combat organised crime. The problem
has been placed high on the agendas of numerous international
organisations (United Nations, FATF, OECD, Council of Europe
and European Union) and national governments. This report,
with its Annexes A, B and C, intends to furnish a better
understanding of the problem and of its policy implications. The
seven recommendations set out at the end of the report are
suggestions on how the European Union might protect its
financial system more effectively against the exploitation of
offshore financial centres by organised crime.
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The report begins by examining the point at which the demand
for financial crime meets the supply of financial services furnished
by financial centres and offshore jurisdictions. This is the point at
which the facilities provided by these jurisdictions, compared with
the other more co-operative and more closely regulated ones, may
be exploited by criminals in order to reduce the ‘law enforcement
risk’. The latter is the sum of the probabilities that members of
criminal organisations will be intercepted, arrested and convicted
and the proceeds of their crime confiscated, and that the
organisation itself will be disrupted. After discussing the rationale
for such exploitation by organised crime – and after concluding
that the combination of the facilities provided by offshore
jurisdictions and the increasing availability of information about
them (through the media, Internet and professionals) may
heighten the risk of their exploitation by organised criminals – in
order to suggest effective remedies, this report seeks to determine
and to explain in which jurisdictions and sectors of regulation
these financial facilities are to be found, and endeavours to
quantify them.
The facilities offered by financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions are often, but not always, the result of asymmetries in
regulation. These asymmetries may be defined as the differences
between a certain type of regulation and the integrity standards
established by the international community to protect financial
systems.1 The underlying assumptions on which this research has
been based are: (1) the risk of exploitation is a function of
asymmetries in regulation, and (2) protection of the EU financial
system is a function of the risk of exploitation. Summarising the
two functions implies that the protection of the EU financial
system depends on the level assumed by asymmetries in
regulation between EU countries and offshore jurisdictions.
Given that the risk of exploitation is determined by the
asymmetries in regulation and that legislation plays a considerable
role in reducing them, and consequently that the level of
protection of the EU financial system depends on the level of the
risk of exploitation, this report seeks to answer the following
questions:
Which group of jurisdictions deviates most markedly from the general integrity
standards and in which sector/s?
How substantial are the asymmetries in each of these sectors and in which
group of jurisdictions?
                                                
1 As explained in Section 10, this concept has been operationalised as ‘integrity
standard’, which may be defined as the ‘optimal level of regulation’ in different sectors
of law (criminal, administrative, commercial, banking, international co-operation
regulations). The ‘optimal level of regulation’ is that which ensures the optimal integrity
of a country’s financial system.
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What remedies can be suggested to reduce the risk of exploitation and ensure
the best protection of the EU financial system?
Three groups of ‘financial centres and offshore jurisdictions’ were
selected according to their level of (geographical, political,
economic) ‘proximity’ to the European Union member states,
which were treated as another homogeneous group (Group 0).
The four groups selected were:
- Group 0 - EU member states
- Group 1 – European financial centres and offshore jurisdictions – those
that are not member states of the Union but have special
geographical, political or economic links with the European
Union;
- Group 2 - Economies in transition – those jurisdictions belonging
to the ex-Soviet Bloc and those located in the Balkan region.
Some of these countries are connected with the European
Union by Association Agreements and have commenced the
process of gaining entry to the European Union;
- Group 3 - Non-European offshore jurisdictions – those jurisdictions
entirely unconnected with the European Union.
Analysis was then conducted for each jurisdiction of the
organised crime activities to which its facilities were vulnerable,
followed by detailed description of regulations in the sectors of
criminal law and criminal procedure, as well as of administrative,
commercial and banking regulations and international co-
operation (see Annex A).
A number of primary and secondary sources were used to
conduct this analysis.
The primary sources were:
- replies to the questionnaires prepared by the three
research units and sent via Interpol to respondents (Police,
Justice, Central Bank and Finance authorities) in most of
the jurisdictions mentioned (see Annex B to the report for
the full text of the questionnaires).
- the reactions by the various jurisdictions to their country
profiles (which were sent to each of them), and this
enabled the information in Annex A to be checked for
accuracy and updated;
- the replies to a questionnaire drawn up by TRANSCRIME -
University of Trento on company law regulations and sent to
members of the International Organisation of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) in most of the jurisdictions
considered.
The secondary sources were: white literature (research reports,
scientific and professional journals), police and press reports.
Euroshore
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In order to minimise the risk that information might be out-of-
date or invalid, the results of the analysis on objectives A) and B)
were sent to various jurisdictions to obtain their reactions. Their
replies have been incorporated, when possible, in Annex A.
The overall levels of these asymmetries were then quantified for
the purpose of comparative analysis. Two comparisons were
made: a) among asymmetries representing the distance of the
regulatory systems of the three groups from the optimal levels of
integrity established by operationalising the concept of standards
as adopted by the international community; b) among
asymmetries representing the distance of the regulatory systems
of the three groups of jurisdictions considered from the levels of
integrity set by the European Union members states.
The research provides a detailed analysis of the country profiles,
having previously operationalised criteria, indicators and
standards. The findings consist of (a) quantification of the
deviation by Groups of jurisdictions from the general integrity
standards; (b) deviation by Groups of jurisdictions from EU
standards.
The general conclusions of this analysis and the consequent policy
implications may be summarised as follows.
NOT ONLY OFFSHORE
The distinction between offshore and onshore is losing much of
its conventional meaning if construed as the opposition between
opacity and transparency. Some offshore jurisdictions are moving
towards tougher criminal law legislation and international co-
operation, and somewhat more transparency (Group 1 - EU
financial centres and offshore jurisdictions and Group 2 -
Economies in transition), while others (Group 3 - Non-EU
offshore jurisdictions) adhere to their traditions of lenient
criminal law, non-cooperation and opacity. At the same time,
countries with long traditions as financial centres display the same
or lower standards of regulation with respect to those officially
termed ‘offshore’.
ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS WORK : INCOMING MEMBERS TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION ARE CHANGING THEIR CRIMINAL LAW AND
INTRODUCING FINANCIAL REGULATION
The results of the research show quite clearly that, as offshore and
onshore compete to attract capital (and sometime obtain ‘dirty’
Euroshore
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capital as well), so countries belonging to Group 2 are tightening
their criminal legislation and giving greater transparency to their
financial regulations. The influence of the European Union is
evident in this process, highlighting the positive role of regional
institutions like the European Union in improving the integrity
standards of surrounding countries.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROXIMITY WORKS: THE CLOSER
OFFSHORE JURISDICTIONS ARE TO EUROPEAN UNION, THE LESS
THEY DEVIATE FROM THE INTEGRITY STANDARDS SET BY THEIR
REGULATIONS AND FROM THOSE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Not only do Association Agreements work but also proximity
with the European Union seems to be beneficial. The results of
the research show that offshore jurisdictions belonging to Group
1 (those with geographical, economical and political links with the
European Union) deviate less from integrity standards than do
other jurisdictions in Group 3 (offshore with no links with the
European Union). With the exception of company law, all the
other sectors of regulation obtain better results than do equivalent
sectors of Group 3.
THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM SHOULD BECOME MORE
TRANSPARENT BEFORE IT CAN CREDIBLY ASK OTHERS TO ‘CLEAN
UP THEIR ACT’
 
 The first two conclusions assert that a regional approach works,
and that when offshore financial centres remain in the political
and economical periphery of the European Union greater
integrity arises in their standards of regulation, with the
consequent reduction of the risk that their financial facilities may
be exploited by organised crime. This holds for almost all the
regulatory systems analysed by this research project with the
exception of one, namely company law. Comparing the score for
the deviation by the company law of European member states
from the integrity standards shows that EU company law deviates
by 0.22 from the general integrity standards, which is slightly less
than the deviation by Group 2 (0.30) and significantly less than
that by Group 1 (0.46) and Group 3 (0.47) of financial centres
and offshore jurisdictions. This signifies that in at least one crucial
sector of regulation, the European Union members states have
not ‘cleaned up their act’ before asking others to do so. This
‘cleaning-up’ process should be accelerated for two reasons.
Firstly for the sake of credibility. The European financial system
cannot ask others to change their regulatory systems with a view
to improving the integrity of their financial systems without itself
having done so first. Secondly, because company law regulation is
the most essential factor in the transparency of a financial system.
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 COMPANY LAW EXERTS A ‘DOMINO’ EFFECT ON THE OPACITY OF
OTHER SECTORS OF REGULATION
Company law contributes more than other sectors of regulation
to the level of a financial system’s transparency/opacity. It sets
share capital and regulates the issue of bearer shares by limited
liability companies, the possibility that legal entities may act as
directors, the requirement of establishing a registered office, and
also the obligatory auditing of financial statements in the case of
limited liability companies and the keeping of share-holders’
registers. According to the type of regulation, company law
produces the greater transparency or the greater opacity of a
financial system, thereby influencing the other sectors of
regulation and determining the effectiveness of police and
international judicial co-operation. This is the ‘domino’ effect of
company law: if this type of regulation seeks to maximise
anonymity in financial transactions, enabling the creation of shell
or shelf companies whose owners remain largely unknown
(because other companies own them), such anonymity will be
transferred to other sectors of the law. Thus the names of
ultimate beneficial owners or the beneficiaries of financial
transactions will remain obscure, which thwarts criminal
investigation and prosecution. Police co-operation should
concentrate on physical persons, not legal entities, and if company
law maximises anonymity, then the ineffectiveness of criminal law
and police and judicial co-operation is inevitable. The same effect
arises in banking law, where bank secrecy becomes a marginal
issue owing to the anonymity enjoyed by the companies operating
bank accounts under surveillance. The ‘domino’ effect, therefore,
influences the other sectors of regulation, producing much of the
opacity surrounding a financial system. Consequently, this
research suggests, if asymmetries are greater in this sector than in
others, company law is the point from which action to protect
financial systems against exploitation by organised crime should
begin, both in Europe and elsewhere.
Better understanding of the exploitation of financial and offshore
centres by organised crime is afforded by the case studies of
‘offshore in action’ (drawn from international law enforcement
operations) comprised in this report. The data and the case
studies point to the policy implication that, since criminal law and
criminal procedure law have reduced the distance between the less
regulated and the well regulated jurisdictions2, real changes would
be brought about by introducing greater transparency into the
rules on the establishment of corporations and their operations.
This would enable law enforcement agencies and regulators to
identify the physical persons whose interests are being managed.
Rules of corporate governance combining efficiency with
transparency of ownership should be extended to encompass a
                                                
2 See Group 1.
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further kind of transparency: one targeted on the optimal level of
integrity. This form of transparency will reduce the risk of the
criminal exploitation of financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions, rendering international co-operation with law
enforcement agencies truly effective. Only in this case will
‘following the money trail’ yield investigative results that can be
used to prosecute criminals and disrupt their organisations.
Corporations and governments should be aware that facilitating
identification of the physical persons who operate in financial
markets will, in the long run, increase the transparency of financial
systems without impairing their efficiency. The less it is likely that
‘dirty money’ can pollute competition among enterprises and
infiltrate legitimate enterprises, the less it is likely that illicit
operators will proliferate to the advantage of legitimate ones.
Partnership among corporations, regulatory and law enforcement
authorities and governments would foster this process.
With these results in mind, and following consultations with
experts in various fields, this report proposes seven
recommendations which suggest three different levels of action
by the European Union Institutions to protect its financial
system:
- harmonising and raising, when necessary, the level of
regulation among EU member states (harmonisation);
- exporting the standards thus achieved to financial and
offshore centres, the purpose being to reduce the asymmetries
between the regulatory systems of financial centres and
offshore jurisdictions and those of the EU member states
(active protection - reduction of asymmetries);
- preventing EU financial mechanisms (financial and non-
financial institutions) from receiving financial transactions
originating in financial and offshore centres outside the EU
unless they meet the level of regulation of the EU member
states (passive protection - exclusion), the purpose being to prevent
pollution of the EU financial system.
Described for each recommendation is its background and
rationale, the remedy proposed and its aim. The seven
recommendations are outlined on the next page.
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THE SEVEN RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE EUROSHORE PROJECT TO
THE EUROPEAN UNION
1. The introduction of an ‘all crimes’ anti-money laundering legislation is
recommended, accompanied at the same time by a well-defined list of
predicate offences to be included as distinct crimes in each jurisdiction.
2. The enactment in other jurisdictions of money laundering legislation
consistent with the standards set by the EU Money Laundering
Directive, as amended.
3. The introduction of the liability of corporations, either administrative
(short term) or criminal (long term), as a generic sanction on crimes
committed by corporations.
4. The requirement that EU financial institutions accepting transactions
from countries outside the EU must impose the disclosure – together
with the name of the person ordering the transaction – of the names of
the director of the corporation and of the trustee, together with those of
the ultimate beneficial owner (i.e. main shareholder) of the corporation
itself and of the beneficiary and settlor of a trust. If the EU institution
fails to require this disclosure, it should be subjected to sanction.
5. Exploration of the feasibility of establishing a system of incentives for
credit and financial institutions (from minimum measures of
involvement intended to show these institutions the concrete results of
their anti-money laundering action, to maximum measures consisting in
economic rewards when reporting has been essential for the conviction
of criminals and/or confiscation of criminal assets), the purpose being to
enhance and give greater effectiveness to co-operation between credit
and financial institutions and law enforcement authorities.
6. Examination of the feasibility of eliminating the issuance of bearer shares
and of eliminating nominee shareholders; of setting minimum capital
requirements for the incorporation of companies; of mandating the
drafting and depositing of audited financial statements; of creating public
registers of companies. Examination of these possibilities is especially
recommended as regards companies located in financial and offshore
centres with a view to preventing the use of companies as vehicles for
money laundering. This recommendation, if implemented, would assist
in ascertaining the real identities of the persons on whose behalf financial
transactions are conducted, and it is therefore closely connected with
recommendation no. 4.
7. The introduction of certain minimum requirements, such as the
registration of trust deeds and disclosure of the identities of the settlor
and the beneficiary, for the purpose of enhancing transparency in trust
law. This recommendation, if implemented, would assist in ascertaining
the identities of the persons on whose behalf transactions are conducted
and is therefore closely connected with recommendations no. 4.
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4. Introduction This report sets out the results of the research project entitled
“EUROSHORE. Protecting the EU financial system from the exploitation
of financial centres and offshore facilities by organised crime”, awarded by
the European Commission under Falcone Programme 1998
(contract no. 1998/TFJHA_FAL/116). The undertaking of the
research was suggested by the Italian Minister of Justice at a
meeting of the European Council of Ministers held in March
1998.
The project proposal was prepared in August 1998, following
Recommendation no. 30 of the EU Action Plan against organised
crime of April 1997. To implement this recommendation,
Member States “should examine how to take action and provide adequate
defences against the use by organised crime of financial centres and offshore
facilities, in particular when they are located in places subject to their
jurisdiction. With respect to those located elsewhere, the Council should
develop a common policy, consistent with the policy conducted by Member
States internally, with a view to prevent the use thereof by criminal
organisations operating within the Union”.
The subtitle following the project's acronym “Euroshore”
encapsulates this recommendation: protecting the EU financial system
from the exploitation of financial centres and offshore facilities by organised
crime.
The summary presented with the research proposal stated the
following:
Aim:
The project will develop proposals for EU action plans to harmonise
differences in transparency standards, which characterise financial
centres and offshore facilities with respect to the European Union
Member States, and to provide adequate defences against the use by
organised crime of these markets.
Problem:
Due to their role in the international payments system, a number of
financial centres and offshore facilities damage the EU financial system
by offering services which facilitate money laundering activities and
satisfy the need for anonymity among criminal organisations in
economic operations. These countries take advantage of special
economic and financial relations with the European Union and thus
they can be considered as open windows for capital which finds
investment opportunities within the Union.
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Solution:
The action plans will highlight deficiencies in legislation and practice
with respect to money laundering, indicate the most appropriate effective
and feasible initiatives to be adopted by the European Union and its
Member States to prevent their exploitation by organised crime groups
and suggest ways of incentivating forms of co-operation aimed at
resolving existing loopholes.
How:
The project will analyse the most recent trends and changes in money
laundering mechanisms, methods and instruments and highlight the
legislative characteristics of financial centres and offshore facilities,
which make them particularly attractive for criminals. The results of
this work could be used to create EU action plans.
This report is organised as follows:
- Executive summary (Section 3);
- Introduction (Section 4);
- How the offshore problem is considered by international
institutions and national governments (Section 5);
- How the demand for financial crime meets the supply of
financial facilities by financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions (Section 6);
- Two assumptions concerning the relationship between
regulatory asymmetries, the risk of exploitation of financial
centres and offshore jurisdictions by organised crime and
protection of the EU financial system (Section 7);
- Methodology and data collection procedures (Section 8);
- Country profiles (Section 9 and Annex A);
- Operational definitions of Criteria, Standards and Indicators
for the assessment of asymmetries in regulation (Section 10
and Annex C);
- Analysis (Section 11);
- Case studies on ‘offshores in action’ (Section 12);
- A proposal for seven EU recommendations (Section 13).
Given that the goal of the research was to analyse the risk of
exploitation of financial centres and offshore jurisdictions by
organised crime, with a view to suggesting guidelines to the
European Union for action in various fora, the reading of the
present report will be facilitated by the following explanations of
key concepts.
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Offshore financial centres
A working definition of this concept is essential. Although
‘offshore’ does not automatically denote illegal or criminal
activity, numerous international organisations (UN, FATF,
OECD, Council of Europe and European Union) and national
governments have pointed out the risk that facilities provided by
financial centres and offshore jurisdictions may be exploited by
organised crime groups. The offshore problem, indeed, is an
important item on their political agendas.
The present report uses the term used by the Financial Action
Task Force of “non-co-operative countries and territories”, integrating it
with the practical qualification of these countries as ‘under-
regulated’ jurisdictions now current among professionals. These
two concepts are commonly found in the public  perception
about offshores, which as a concept, is becoming synonymous
with ‘under-regulated and non-co-operative jurisdictions’3.
‘Under-regulated’ signifies that their regulation in one or more of
the following areas - financial, tax, company, currency, criminal,
administrative laws - falls below the standards of regulation set
out in the instruments provided by the international community
(Basle principles, FATF recommendations, International
Auditing, etc.) to protect the integrity of financial systems
(hereinafter ‘integrity standards’). On the other hand, the concept
of ‘non-co-operative’ applies to those countries and territories
which do not co-operate in principle (by not signing and/or
ratifying instruments of international co-operation elaborated by
the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the OECD, etc.). In
this report the term ‘jurisdiction’ is used broadly to cover the
many geographical, political and economic issues that concern the
countries and territories termed ‘offshore’. These criteria are
perhaps more efficacious than others such as the ratio between
deposits by residents and non residents or the ratio between the
number of companies and the population. These statistics, when
reliable, confirm a self-evident assumption: that these jurisdictions
attract money because they are under-regulated and non-co-
operative.
Organised crime
The concept of organised crime was given a broad definition for
the purpose of this research. The term, in fact, is polysemous.4 A
                                                
3 This definition has been used in the E.U. Savona’s general report “Questions and
answers on the nexus between corruption and offshore financial centres”  prepared  for
the Council of Europe Fourth European Conference of Specialised Services in the Fight against
Corruption, Limassol, Cyprus, 20-21 October 1999
4 For an analysis of the various definitions of "organised crime" see: S. Adamoli, A. Di
Nicola, E.U. Savona, P. Zoffi, Organised Crime around the World, report prepared by
TRANSCRIME - University of Trento for HEUNI - United Nations, HEUNI
Publication Series n. 31, Helsinki, 1998, pp. 4-10; 132-142.
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useful working definition is the one used by the Joint Action of
21 December 1998, adopted by the Council of the European
Union on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European
Union on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal
organisation in the Member States of the European Union. Article
1 of this Joint Action states:
“…A criminal organization shall mean a structured association, established
over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in concert with a view
to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a
detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty,
whether such offences are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining
material benefits and, where appropriate, of improperly influencing the
operation of public authorities.”
Risk of exploitation
This concept denotes the likelihood that the facilities (criminal,
administrative, banking, company) provided by financial centres
and offshore jurisdictions may be used for purposes forbidden by
law and contrary to integrity standards (see the standards
identified in Section 10 of this report).
Protecting EU financial markets
The subtitle of the research project explains its rationale: to
contribute to protection of the EU financial system. The grouping
of countries according to their ‘proximity’ to the European Union
(see Section 8), the main assumptions, and the perspective from
which the recommendations have been drafted are all inspired by
this rationale.
This report considers the protection of the EU financial system to
be a functional objective achievable through active or passive
action vis-à-vis countries providing financial facilities which
increase their vulnerability to exploitation by organised crime. For
present purposes, protection may be defined as the condition
which ensures that illicit proceeds do not pollute the legitimate
European financial markets and business competition. The term
also covers the capacity of the European Union member states to
recover the proceeds of crime transferred to financial and
offshore centres for laundering.
It should be pointed out that EU financial markets may be
involved either in the layering stage of money laundering or in the
integration of illicit proceeds as investments in legitimate
European markets, after the laundering process has begun, with
placement of such proceeds in a financial or offshore centre.
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5. Offshores in the
political agenda
Among international organisations, the United Nations5 has been
actively engaged in analysis of money laundering in general, and
of financial centres and offshore jurisdictions in particular. The
report Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering6,
issued by the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime
Prevention, stresses the potential role of offshore financial centres
in money laundering, stating that “criminal organisations are making
wide use of the opportunities offered by financial havens and offshore centres to
launder criminal assets, thereby creating roadblocks to criminal investigations.
Financial havens offer an extensive array of facilities to foreign investors who
are unwilling to disclose the origin of their assets.[…] The difficulties for law
enforcement agencies are amplified by the fact that, in many cases, financial
havens enforce very strict financial secrecy, effectively shielding foreign investors
from investigations and prosecutions from their home countries.”7
In 1998 the OECD produced the report Harmful Tax Competition8
which examines harmful tax practices in the form of tax havens
and harmful preferential tax regimes in OECD member countries
and their dependencies. The report focuses on geographically
mobile activities, such as financial and other services. It defines
the factors to be used in identification of harmful tax practices
and sets out nineteen wide-ranging Recommendations to
counteract such practices.9
These Recommendations are divided into three categories:10
- recommendations concerning domestic legislation;
- recommendations concerning tax treaties;
- recommendations for intensification of international co-
operation.
                                                
5 UN Global Programme Against Money Laundering of 1997 and the UN Anti-money
Laundering Programme launched at the special Session of the UN General Assembly on
the World Drug problem, 8-10 June 1998, New York.
6 J. Blum, M. Levi, T. Naylor, P. Williams, Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money
Laundering, issue 8 of the UNDCP Technical Series, New York, 1998.
7 J. Blum, M. Levi, T. Naylor, P. Williams, J. Blum, M. Levi, T. Naylor, P. Williams, op.
cit, p. 1.
8 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition. An Emerging Global Issue, OECD, Paris, 1998.
9 The factors with which to identify tax havens are:
- whether a jurisdiction imposes no or only nominal taxes and offers itself, or is
perceived to offer itself, as a place to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their
country of residence;
- laws or administrative practices which prevent the effective exchange of relevant
information with other governments on taxpayers benefiting from the low or no tax
jurisdiction;
- lack of transparency;
- the absence of a requirement that the activity be substantial, since this would
suggest that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract investment or transactions
that are purely tax driven (i.e., these centres are essentially ‘booking centres’).
Moreover, there are four key factors which identify preferential tax regimes:
- the regime imposes a low or zero effective tax rate on the relevant income;
- the regime is ‘ring-fenced’;
- the operation of the regime is non-transparent;
- the jurisdiction operating the regime does not effectively exchange information with
other countries.
For more extensive information see OECD, op. cit., pp. 22-34.
10 For more detailed analysis see OECD, op. cit., chapter Three, pp. 37-55.
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The Report concludes that “there is a strong case for intensifying
international co-operation when formulating a response to the problem of
harmful tax competition, although the counteracting measures themselves will
continue to be primarily taken at the national, rather than at the multilateral
level. The need for co-ordinated action at the international level is also
apparent from the fact that the activities […] are highly mobile. In this
context, and in the absence of international co-operation, there is little
incentive for a country which provides a harmful preferential tax regime to
eliminate it since this could merely lead the activity to move to another country
which continues to offer a preferential treatment.”11
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF),
the leading international body on anti-money laundering, has also
been concerned with the issue. Its latest Annual Report12 of July
1999 devotes a section to the “non-cooperative countries or territories”.
In order to tackle the problem, FATF has established an Ad Hoc
Group to discuss future action in detail. The scope of the group's
work extends both within and outside FATF membership. The
priority task of the Ad Hoc Group has been to define the
detrimental rules and practices which impair the effectiveness of
anti-money laundering systems and to determine criteria for
definition of non-co-operative jurisdictions. As a result, FATF has
adopted twenty-five criteria, which at the time of writing have not
yet been published, but which cover such aspects as loopholes in
financial regulations (e.g., inadequate customer identification,
inadequacy of rules on financial intermediaries), the obstacles
raised by regulatory requirements (e.g., inadequate or no
requirement for the registration of business and legal entities and
the identification of their beneficial owners), the obstacles to
international co-operation at both the administrative and the
judicial levels (e.g., existence of laws or practices prohibiting the
international exchange of information), and inadequate resources
for the prevention and detection of money laundering. In
addition, the FATF Ad Hoc Group has agreed on a process for
identifying non-co-operative countries or territories.
The identification of jurisdictions which fulfil the aforementioned
criteria, and definition of action to eliminate detrimental rules and
practices, are the next steps for the FATF’s work in this area.
                                                
11 OECD, op. cit., p. 38.
12 FATF, Annual Report 1998-99, 2 July 1999, p. 35.
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The Council of Europe has always been extremely active in the
fight against money laundering. Among the numerous initiatives
undertaken by the Council of Europe as regards financial centres
and offshore jurisdictions are Resolution no. 114713 adopted by
the Assembly on 28 January 1998 and the activities of the Select
Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of anti-money
laundering measures (PC-R-EV). The recent 4th European
Conference of Specialized Services in the Fight against
Corruption14 was devoted to the issue of “international co-operation in
the fight against corruption and offshore financial centres”, focusing on
obstacles and solutions. The conclusions adopted by the
Conference outline the potential role of offshore jurisdictions in
money laundering:15
“Whereas some offshore jurisdictions offer bank secrecy, confidentiality,
anonymity, tax avoidance facilities and fail to provide international co-
operation in criminal matters, others have introduced measures of supervision
and control that easily match, or on occasion may even exceed, those that can
be found in some onshore jurisdictions. The services provided by offshore
centres are particularly attractive for individuals and companies involved in
corruption transactions, the setting-up of slush funds, the laundering of
                                                
13 Extract from Resolution no. 1147: “The Assembly calls for new strategies that permit the co-
ordination of different financial investigations targeting the assets of organised economic crime. Such
initiatives may require quick legal mechanisms to lift banking secrecy and various provisions under
which bankers, judiciaries, accountants and lawyers may be compelled by judicial order to suspend their
vow of professional confidentiality and produce bank records or other financial statements or, if
necessary, give testimony. Consideration should also be given to the possibility for different countries
having participated in a law-enforcement operation to share assets recuperated, insofar as they cannot be
returned to their rightful owners.
Special attention should be given to economic crime, money laundering and corruption being undertaken
in the rapidly growing field of electronic commerce, as studied particularly within the OECD. Co-
operation between the Council of Europe and the OECD should be stepped up to accelerate the shaping
of legislation and conventions in this field.
Member states should agree to draw up, within the framework of the Council of Europe, regular reports
on the situation in their countries as regards economic crime, money laundering and corruption for joint
examination within the Organisation, through a body which could advise countries on ways to improve
the situation. Such a body should also be accessible to ordinary citizens in member states who feel
affected by these ills. Finally, member states should consider introducing an ombudsman or commissioner
at national level (where such a person does not exist already), or within existing regional or
international organisations where available.
The Assembly invites member states which have not yet done so to join the Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering (FATF) or at least to make use of its work. The new body mentioned in
paragraph 7 above should also be entrusted with the task of monitoring and evaluating the anti-money
laundering policies of all member states.
The Assembly also invites member states to include in their upper secondary school curricula the subject
of organised crime and illicit economic activities in order to encourage prevention and offer citizens
possible means, including individual means, of defending themselves.
The Assembly welcomes the agreement reached in November 1997 among the member countries of the
OECD on a convention on combating bribery in international business transactions, including that of
foreign public officials, and calls on all member states of the Council of Europe, including non-OECD
members, to sign and ratify this open treaty as soon as possible.
Finally, the Assembly calls for as close a co-ordination as possible between the Council of Europe and
the European Union in the fields mentioned, especially in view of future European Union enlargement”.
14 4th European Conference of Specialized Services in the Fight against Corruption,
subject: International Co-operation in the fight against corruption and offshore financial
centres: obstacles and solutions, held in Limassol (Cyprus) on 20-22 October, 1999.
15 4th European Conference of Specialized Services in the Fight against Corruption,
subject: International Co-operation in the fight against corruption and offshore financial
centres: obstacles and solutions, Conclusions adopted by the Conference following a
proposal by Ernesto U. Savona, General Rapporteur, Limassol (Cyprus), 20-22 October
1999.
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proceeds and the creation of shell companies being facilitated by offshore
environments. Experience shows that modern corruption schemes often involve
the use of shell companies or bank accounts domiciled in offshore centres.”
Various impediments against international co-operation are then
identified:
- “differences in company laws and other related regulatory norms, in
particular the possibility of setting up shell or letter-box companies
lacking any commercial or industrial activity which often do not require
minimum capital, audited accounts, annual general meetings or even a
locally appointed administrator;
- the fact that such shell or letter-box companies are used for operating
outside the territory of offshore centres where they have been created,
rendering their control difficult or even impossible;
- the lack of means to identify the ultimate physical beneficial owner of shell
or letter box companies;
- the reluctance to sign, ratify or implement treaties on international co-
operation in criminal and administrative matters;
- insufficient staffing and training of law enforcement personnel;
- insufficient knowledge about the patterns and methods of corruption
transactions using offshore centres;
- the misuse of rules providing for bank secrecy, confidentiality, professional
privilege and immunities.”
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The concluding document of the Conference proposes measures
to be taken at the national16 and at international level.17
The European Union has taken action against money laundering
through financial centres and offshore jurisdictions with its
Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime adopted by the Council
on 28 April 1997 (97/C 251/01). Recommendation no. 30 reads
as follows: “Member States should examine how to take action and provide
adequate defences against the use by organised crime of financial centres and
offshore facilities in particular where these are located in places subject to their
jurisdiction. With respect to those located elsewhere, the Council should
develop a common policy, consistent with the policy conducted by Member
States internally, with a view to prevent the use thereof by criminal
organisations operating within the Union (see political guideline no.
12)”.
                                                
16 These measures envisage action on the following: company law, bank secrecy,
identification and reporting of suspicious transactions, law enforcement personnel,
professionals.
17 Some of the proposed measures are:
- international co-operation should be enhanced through the use of available
instruments, recommendations and initiatives developed by international
organisations;
- in this context it seems necessary to speedily implement the decisions of the recent
extraordinary European Council of Tampere to reinforce the fight against serious
organised crime, to develop common standards to prevent the use of corporations
and entities registered outside the jurisdiction of the Union in the hiding of criminal
proceeds and in money laundering, and to provide for arrangements with offshore
centres with a view to ensuring efficient and transparent co-operation in mutual
legal assistance;
- the launching of the activities of the “Group of States against Corruption –
GRECO”;
- negotiations should be launched on the drafting of a Protocol to the Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS
n° 141);
- Council of Europe member states which have not ratified the Additional Protocol
(ETS n° 99) to the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters (ETS n° 30) should be urged to do so without delay, and all Council of
Europe member states should be invited to sign and ratify the Civil Law
Convention on Corruption (ETS N°174);
- the Council of Europe should be invited to update the European Convention of
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, simplifying the procedures of rogatory
letters, providing for direct contact between judicial authorities and reducing the
grounds for refusals of assistance;
- the Council of Europe should be invited to examine the possibility of drafting a
European Convention on tax fraud;
- the Council of Europe should be invited to consider ways of providing for more
expeditious and efficient extradition procedures among its member States.
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Moreover, the European Commission has monitored the
implementation of the EU anti-money laundering Directive
91/308 and is now preparing a new directive to enhance the
recommendations to member countries and enlarge the subjects
involved. The adoption of this new version of the Directive,
together with stronger action towards financial centres and
offshore jurisdictions, was recommended by the meeting of the
European Council held in Tampere (Finland) on 15-16 October
1999 18.
National governments, too, have started to consider, and to take
action against, the potential illicit use of offshore jurisdictions for
money laundering operations. Some relevant examples of such
action are the following.
The United States of America are changing their anti-money
laundering legislation and considering the introduction of tough
measures against offshore centres.
The United Kingdom has paid close attention to the problem,
issuing the White Paper on Britain and Overseas Territories of 17
March 1999 and the recent review of the operations of offshore
financial centres in its Caribbean dependent territories and
Bermuda.19 In particular, the White Paper clearly states the risk
that offshore centres in general, and a significant number of the
Overseas Territories (especially those in the Caribbean but also
Bermuda and Gibraltar) in particular, may be exploited by
criminals for money laundering purposes: “The international financial
services industry has grown dramatically in recent decades. […] The success of
the Overseas Territories has been built upon by their reputation for sound
administration, effective legal systems, political stability and public order, and
their association with the UK. […] The development of sizeable financial
sectors brings risks of abuse. There have already been a number of problems.
[…] As markets develop and techniques for laundering money, fraud, tax
evasion and regulatory abuse evolve, so financial regulatory systems must
improve, be updated, and be responsive to ever tighter international standards.
The Caribbean Overseas Territories in particular are a potential target for
money launderers because of their offshore financial business, their proximity
to major drug producing and consuming countries and, in some cases, their
inadequate standard of regulation and strict confidentiality rules. They are
also at risk from attempted fraud. In some cases, the small size of their public
sectors makes it difficult to provide adequate regulation, particularly if the
                                                
18 Recommendations n. 57 and 58 refer to the issue of offshore jurisdictions. Following
Recommendation no. 57 “Common standards should be developed in order to prevent  the use of
corporations and entities registered outside the jurisdiction of the Union in the hiding of criminal
proceeds and in money laundering. The Union and Member States should make arrangements with
third country offshore. centres to ensure efficient and transparent co-operation in mutual legal assistance
following the recommendations made in this area by the Financial Action Task Force”.
Recommendation n. 58 states that “The Commission is invited to draw up a report identifying
provisions in national banking, financial and corporate legislation which obstruct international co-
operation. The Council is invited to draw  necessary conclusions on the basis of this report .”
19 “Operations of Offshore Financial Centres under spotlight”, in The Financial Times, 21
September 1999.
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offshore sector has grown more rapidly than regulatory capacity. International
financial crime and regulatory abuse arising in the Overseas Territories is
mainly targeted at other countries.”20
On 25 September 1999 it was reported21 that France had drawn
up nine proposals to crack down on tax havens and money
laundering. According to unofficial sources, these proposals
include the following:
- an international ban on under-regulated legal entities, such as
shield companies and opaque trusts;
- improvement of legislation against money-laundering by
extending the scope of indictments and mandatory reports by
financial institutions of suspicious transactions to include
bribery;
- the enlistment of non-financial agents such as lawyers, real-
estate agents and casinos in the fight against money
laundering;
- the drawing up a list of non-cooperative states and territories
identified by objective criteria, such as their lack of
indictments for money-laundering, opaque commercial law
which prevents identification of beneficiaries, inadequate or
non-existent financial standards and supervision, inadequate
prudential and judicial instruments, and non-existent or
deficient judicial co-operation with other countries and
international bodies;
- persuading these states to adhere to international standards
and urging the automatic lifting of bank secrecy rules in
investigations and judicial proceedings;
- closer co-operation among anti-money-laundering authorities,
possibly through creation of an international alert mechanism;
- to permit the simultaneous freezing of suspects' accounts.
(Although a suspect's accounts can be frozen in one
jurisdiction, the suspect is more often than not free to move
his/her assets around other countries whose legal systems are
more cumbersome or whose governments are loath to clamp
down on money-laundering);
- closer involvement of international financial institutions (like
the IMF and the World Bank) in the fight against corruption
and money laundering. This could be achieved through the
attachment of conditions when providing financial aid, a bar
on public entities in countries benefiting from multilateral
support from dealing with offshore centres, and the
independent auditing of critical sectors;
                                                
20 Partnership for Progress and Prosperity. Britain and the Overseas territories, presented to
Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by
Command of Her Majesty, March 1999, pp. 22-24. The White Paper is available in full
at the web site of Great Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the following
address: http://www.fco.gov.uk/.
21 In Dow Jones News, 25 September 1999.
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- the setting up of a separate department within the IMF to
attend to governance issues;
- enforcement of the new rules by sanctions, which might also
comprise the halting of public financial flows to states and
territories which do not comply with the rules or at least make
an effort to do so. Also proposed are partial, total, temporary
or permanent restrictions on capital flows with non-
cooperative or under-regulated offshore centres.
All of these initiatives are important, for they confirm that the
problem of financial centres and offshore jurisdictions is one of
international public concern. However, this substantial concern is
matched by very little action. Numerous economic and political
difficulties obstruct effective concerted action. Some countries
strive to limit the damage to their tax systems by  signing bilateral
tax treaties that will probably solve the problem of the country
involved, displacing inevitably  the distortive effect of tax
competition to other countries. The result of this lack of action is
that the number of financial centres and offshore jurisdictions
grows as competition among different offshores increases, with a
proportional exacerbation of the risk that their facilities may be
exploited for criminal purposes.
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 6. Crime goes offshore This research intends to contribute to the development of the
promising path of ‘organised crime prevention’, which is a recent
and challenging perspective considered by only few analyses22,
empirical studies and practical inquiry.23 The recent joint Forum
organised by the European Commission and Europol24, which has
developed a mandate provided by the second section of the
European Union Action Plan against Organised Crime of 1997
devoted to organised crime prevention, established a clear
framework for development of this theoretical perspective and
concrete action. Its rationale is that there is a broad area of
regulatory measures that could be used to hamper the growth of
organised crime. This action, if properly pursued, would be less
costly and more effective in terms of deterring organised crime
than crime control action alone, with which, however, it should
be combined. Acting on the regulation of the markets infiltrated
and exploited by organised crime requires understanding and
explanation of why and how the demand of organised crime is
matched by opportunities which facilitate its development. The
policy implications of this understanding should be re-regulation
of the mechanisms that produce such opportunities.
In analysing the risk of exploitation of financial centres and
offshore jurisdictions by organised crime this research wants to
stress the concept that it is not that the official facilities offered by
these centres are criminal per se but that those facilities could
produce opportunities for organised crime development and
enrichment. In this direction this research tries to understand why
the demand for financial crime (e.g. fraud, corruption and money
laundering) meets the supply of financial services offered by
offshore jurisdictions, and how does this happen.
 6.1 The demand for laundering the proceeds from crime
 
The laundering of the proceeds of crime is almost automatic
where organised crime groups are concerned. This is the
organised crime-money laundering cycle which links criminal
activities and their proceeds with the need to launder the latter in
order to disguise their criminal origin and enable their
                                                
22 See: E.U. Savona, “La reglementation du marché de la criminalité”, in Revue
Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique, vol. XLV, n. 4, 1992, pp. 472-474;
P.Williams and E.U. Savona (eds), United Nations and Transnational Organised Crime, Frank
Cass, London, 1996, pp. 45-48.
23 Organised Crime Task Force, Corruption and Racketeering in the New York City
Construction Industry, Final Report to Mario Cuomo, N.Y. 1989 and the report Organised
Crime in the Netherlands by C. Fijnaut, F. Bovenkerk, G. Bruinsma and H. van de Bunt,
mentioned by C. Fijnnaut in his introduction to the European Commission – Europol
Forum Forum Towards a European Strategy to Prevent Organised Crime, held in The Hague on 4-5
November 1999.
24 European Commission – Europol, Forum Towards a European Strategy to Prevent Organised
Crime, The Hague, 4-5 November 1999.
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reinvestment in legitimate enterprises.25 The demand for money
laundering is closely connected with the development of
organised crime groups, and it is driven by the following factors:26
- the amount of funds realised by illegal activities;
- the need for the anonymity in economic operations that
certain (not always criminal) business operators and
enterprises frequently enjoy, in order to avoid financial
regulations and criminal legislation and to conceal funds;
- the need to avoid ‘law enforcement risk’, or the sum of the
various probabilities that members of criminal organisations
will be intercepted, arrested and convicted, the proceeds of
crime confiscated, and the organisation disrupted;
- the desire to infiltrate legitimate activities as part of a
continuous process which channels the actions of organised
crime groups into either illegal markets or legitimate
businesses.
It is possible to identify a variety of types of criminal offence
associated with the offshore sector. Financial crimes such as
fraud, tax offences, corruption and money laundering are present
in numerous international operations involving financial centres
and offshore jurisdictions.27 The investigation and prosecution of
complex cases involving such economic crimes frequently reveals
that organised crime groups exploit financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions in a variety of locations.
 6.2 The supply of financial services at risk of exploitation
Criminals prefer financial centres and offshore jurisdictions
because the anonymity guaranteed by their banking, tax and
company regulations provides an effective shield against requests
for information by law enforcement agencies. Anonymity, in fact,
is an essential requisite for the laundering of criminal proceeds
and their reinvestment in the legitimate economy without
incurring the ‘law enforcement risk’. It is possible to argue that
the lesser this risk (due to the opacity of the legislation governing
the services offered by financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions), the greater the probability that organised crime
groups will use financial centres and offshore jurisdictions to
launder the proceeds of their criminal activities.
The overall hypothesis of the research was that financial centres
and offshore jurisdictions provide facilities which reduce the ‘law
enforcement risk’, compared with other non-offshore financial
centres and jurisdictions subject to tighter regulation and offering
                                                
25 E.U. Savona, European Money Trails, Harwood Academic Press, Amsterdam, 1999, p.
2.
26 E.U. Savona, European Money Trails, cit., p. 5.
27 See for examples the cases outlined in Section 12 of this report.
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closer co-operation, the reason being that they are more easily
exploited by criminal organisations.28
The importance of this hypothesis is substantiated by the fact that
an increasing amount of information about the facilities provided
by financial centres and offshore jurisdictions is available in the
media and on the Internet. If we add to this information the
technical advice provided by professionals, the conclusion that
can be drawn is that criminals, whether organised or not, have
today, and will have in the future, more low-cost and risk-free
information at their disposal than in the past.
Having hypothesised that the criminal demand for financial
facilities is met because criminals exploit the facilities offered by
offshore financial centres, a further two points require making,
given their relevance to the policy implications of the problem.
The first is that the combination of the facilities offered by
offshore jurisdictions and the increasing amount of information
about them (furnished by the media, Internet and professionals)
may heighten the risk of their exploitation by organised criminals.
Consequently, since it is impossible to reduce the amount of
information available regarding the services offered by offshore
financial centres, measures should be devised to reduce the
number of those facilities which for criminals constitute an added
value for criminal purposes.
The second point concerns the European context (protecting the
EU financial system) in which the development of the research
was planned. It is clear that the action of criminals is not hindered
by the geographical or political borders of the financial markets
whose legitimate businesses they intend to infiltrate. Criminals are
opportunistic. They go where the opportunities are, and their
choice of the European financial system, like others world-wide,
is a matter of opportunity rather than political preference. In a
global world the preference for the EU financial market may be
of relevance only for criminals who operate in Europe, but it will
be marginal for the others. So why was the research restricted to
the protection of the EU financial system? For two main reasons.
Firstly, the European financial system and market is today a reality
which attracts criminal organisations operating in any part of the
world, as the United States financial system has done for many
years. The introduction of the Euro has accelerated the
                                                
28 We are aware, and this research will show, that not all offshore jurisdictions offer the
same facilities in the same areas, that they co-operation with law enforcement
authorities to differing extents, and above all that, as many national and international
corruption or money laundering operations show, the services provided by offshore
jurisdictions may be illegally obtained in co-operative and well-regulated jurisdictions.
Corruption and violence may be used to pressure banking or non-banking institutions
into satisfying the financial needs of criminal organisations.
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integration of national financial systems and markets into a
unified European system.
Secondly, protecting the European financial system entails
assisting in the protection of the global financial system. The
European Union is able to play a crucial role in what has been
called a ‘three-level response strategy’
(national/regional/international) as the only possible globally
effective strategy against money laundering. In this strategy the
regional level (i.e. Europe) could be used to apply pressure on
non-complying nations and to enhance action in the international
fora. This strategy has been explained elsewhere:29
“The process should be managed in terms of progressively achieving more
responsible country/regional/international mechanisms. The basic unit of
money laundering control is domestic legislation and regulation. However, not
every country, for a number of reasons, will move spontaneously toward
implementation of effective anti-money laundering policies. When a country
does not, a three level response strategy may be implemented. On a bilateral
level its neighbors, other countries damaged by the country's lack of a sufficiently
tight anti-money laundering mesh, and those most able to influence it culturally
and economically, should use education, persuasion, and legitimate forms of
pressure to move the deficient country to create or repair its net. At the same
time the regional organizations, broadly understood to include not only
geographic groupings such as the Organization of American States or Council
of Europe, but also political/cultural groupings such as the Commonwealth,
should exert peer pressure and leadership to bring their member stated up to a
regional minimal standard of anti-money laundering policies. Positive regional
experiences such as the E.U. Directive and the O.A.S. Model Regulations
should be extended to all regions and should become progressively more binding,
that is they should be written to have legal and not only inspirational or
exemplary effect. At the international level the existing organizations can
reinforce these processes going on at the bilateral and regional levels. A non-
complying country which is damaging the international anti-money laundering
effort should know that aid is available from friends and neighbors, from
regional groupings, and from the international community if it wishes to weave
its part of the anti-money laundering net, and that bilateral, regional, and
international disapproval and appropriately measured disincentives are
inevitable if it chooses not to do so”.
Under this strategy, the action of the European Union is not
limited to protecting the EU financial system. In fact, the three
levels of the strategy are targeted on different Groups of
jurisdictions:
                                                
29 E.U. Savona (ed.), Responding to Money Laundering. An International Perspective, Harwood
Academic Press, Amsterdam, 1997, pp. 65-66.
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- the first is targeted on those offshore jurisdictions with close
political and geographical proximity to the EU member states
and concerning which the European Union could apply
pressure on member states;
- the second level concerns those financial centres in central
and eastern Europe that have entered into Association
Agreements with the European Union which provide the
framework also for agreements based on their anti-money
laundering legislation;
- the third level is addressed at those financial centres and
offshore jurisdictions beyond direct proximity with the
European Union and consists in the contribution of the
European Union to those international fora in which action
against money laundering is taken.
This perspective has shaped the criteria used to group the
financial centres and offshore jurisdictions considered by this
research and the recommendations set out in its conclusions (see
Section 8 of this report).
36
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7. Regulatory
asymmetries and the risk
of exploitation of
financial centres and
offshore jurisdictions by
organised crime: two
assumptions and three
questions
The increasing availability of a wide range of business
opportunities publicised through newspapers, periodicals, leaflets
and Internet web sites demonstrates that differences in regulatory
systems induce persons and corporations to use financial centres
and offshore jurisdictions for their financial transactions. In the
context of this research these differences are either in legislation
(criminal, criminal procedure and others) or in administrative and
banking regulations. The use made of these differences may be
legal (i.e. tax avoidance, or more elegantly, tax planning) or
illegal/criminal (i.e. tax evasion and tax fraud). These differences
may also be exploited to commit frauds, undertake corrupted
transactions or launder the proceeds of crime and invest them in
legitimate markets. It could be argued that financial centres and
offshore jurisdictions exist precisely because of these
asymmetries, in that they make financial transactions more rapid
and less expensive. Here asymmetries are understood to be the
differences in a type of regulation among the various Groups of
jurisdictions identified, and among the integrity standards
considered. This report defines ‘integrity standard’ as the optimal
level of regulation within a given sector which ensures the
integrity of a jurisdiction’s financial system and protects it against
infiltration by organised crime (the standards identified are
described in Section 10 of this report).
The services supplied in the offshore market (i.e. tax level, the
types of company offered, the cost of incorporation, the rights
and duties of shareholders and the publicity of company
information, the level of bank secrecy and confidentiality) vary
among jurisdictions and between offshore jurisdictions and more
co-operative and better regulated ones, such as the European
member states.
Regulatory asymmetries generate competition among offshore
jurisdictions because they influence the demand for financial
transactions. A potential investor will be attracted by the
jurisdiction that provides the financial services needed on the
most favourable conditions (reliability and costs in terms of time
and money).
A finding of this research to be emphasised is that, independently
of evaluations of their efficiency, regulatory asymmetries are of
major relevance to the vulnerability of offshore and financial
centres to exploitation by organised crime. The main challenge
posed for the international community is equalising the efficiency
of financial operations in offshore jurisdictions with those
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conducted in onshore ones, but without reducing their
transparency. Equalising levels of efficiency will reduce the
‘harmful tax competition’ which is, by definition, legal but
harmful (as outlined by the OECD30), and it will bolster the
integrity standards intended to minimise the risk of exploitation.
It should also be pointed out that modern legislation on corporate
governance seeks to combine efficiency with transparency, where
transparency is oriented neither towards minimisation of the risk
of exploitation by criminals not towards facilitation of co-
operation with law enforcement agencies. The current debate on
corporate governance perceives transparency as leading to
efficiency. In this report, regulatory asymmetries are measured in
order to evaluate deviations from those integrity standards that, in
the view of the authors, represent the optimal level of regulation,
the one at which the risk of exploitation of these jurisdictions by
organised crime is minimised.
These aspects can be translated into two main assumptions, from
which three research questions spring.
The first assumption is that asymmetries in regulating the
transparency of financial transactions between EU countries and
other financial centres and offshore jurisdictions heighten the risk
that the latter will be exploited by organised crime groups: i.e. the
tighter bank secrecy becomes and the greater the anonymity of
the ultimate beneficial owner, the more criminals are able to
launder the proceeds of crime and return them as investments in
Europe, and the more the risk diminishes that proceeds will be
traced and confiscated and the criminal organisation disrupted.
This signifies, therefore, that the risk of exploitation is a function
of asymmetries in regulation.
The second assumption is that the greater the risk of exploitation
of financial centres and offshore jurisdictions, the more
vulnerable the EU financial system and other financial systems
become to pollution by proceeds of crime which, having passed
through financial and offshore centres, enter the EU financial
system and distort competition among legitimate EU enterprises.
This signifies that protection of the EU financial system is a
function of the risk of exploitation.
Summarising the two functions, one draws the overall conclusion
that protection of the EU financial system depends on the level of
the regulatory asymmetries existing between EU countries and
offshore jurisdictions.
                                                
30 OECD, op. cit.
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Those just stated are key assumptions for this report, and it was
they that guided the research, the aim of which, as said, was to
analyse the risk of exploitation of financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions in order to provide European Union institutions with
guidelines for action in international fora.
Considering that the risk of exploitation is determined by
regulatory asymmetries, that legislation plays a major role in
reducing them, and that consequently the level of the protection
afforded to the EU financial system depends on the level assumed
by the risk of exploitation, the research project was conducted in
order to answer the following questions:
Which group of jurisdictions displays the greatest deviation from the standards
and in which sector/s?
How wide are the asymmetries in each of these sectors and in which group of
jurisdictions?
What remedies can be suggested to reduce the risk of exploitation and ensure
closer protection of the EU financial system?
With this aim in mind, this report moves through the following
stages:
- identification of the jurisdictions to be analysed, according to
criteria selected in view of the purpose of the research, the
objectives analysed, the methodology used and the data
collection procedures selected (Section 8);
- comparative analysis of jurisdictions according to the various
sectors of law (see Annex A and Findings in Section 9.1)
summarised by synoptic tables in Section 9.2;
- definition of criteria, standards and indicators for analysis
(Section 10);
- analysis of asymmetries in relation to groups of jurisdictions
and sectors of law (Section 11);
- analysis of case-studies concerning law enforcement
operations involving offshore jurisdictions, where the latter
have been exploited by organised crime (Section 12);
- the drawing up of seven recommendations to the European
Union institutions with regard to reducing asymmetries,
minimising the risk of exploitation of offshore jurisdictions by
organised crime, and affording better protection to the EU
financial system (Section 13).
40
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8. Methodology and data
collection procedures
 8.1 Countries selected
The financial centres and offshore jurisdictions named in this
report have been selected and grouped according to their level of
‘proximity’ (geographical, political, economic) to European Union
member states.
Group 0 – European Union member states
Group 1 – European financial centres and offshore jurisdictions
Although these jurisdictions are not member states of the
European Union, they are financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions with special geographical, political or economic links
with the European Union. For this reason, they may feasibly be
persuaded to adopt more effective anti-money laundering policies.
Using these geographical, political and economic links as selection
criteria, the countries and territories considered by the research were
the following: Andorra, the British Overseas Territories (which
comprise Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the
Cayman Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands),
Gibraltar, the Channel Islands (which comprise Guernsey and
Jersey), Cyprus, the French West Indies Departments, the Isle of
Man, Liechtenstein, Malta, the Caribbean Territories of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands (which comprises Aruba and the
Netherlands Antilles), the Principality of Monaco, San Marino
and Switzerland.
Group 2 – Economies in transition
The concept of a non-EU financial centre, broadly interpreted,
may be extended to include a further group of jurisdictions – for
instance certain of those which formerly belonged to the Soviet
Bloc and those located in the Balkan region – which today raise
potentially serious threats against the integrity of the European
Union’s financial system. Some of them are linked with the
European Union by Association Agreements and have embarked
on the process of gaining entry to the European Union.31
The research therefore considered the following jurisdictions:
Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Baltic States (which
comprise Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Hungary, Moldova,
                                                
31 The Europe Agreements cover trade-related issues, political dialogue, legal
approximation and other areas of co-operation, including industry, environment,
transport and customs. Of the jurisdictions considered in this research project, besides
Malta and Cyprus, ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe have signed an
Association Agreement with the European Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. All
Association Agreements contain a clause which commits the country to co-operate in
the fight against money laundering.
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Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Ukraine.32
Group 3 – Non-European offshore jurisdictions
The non-European offshore jurisdictions considered are the
Bahamas, the Barbados, Jamaica and Puerto Rico (these four are
connected to the United States by co-operation agreements,
including fiscal issues), the Cook Islands, Hong Kong and Macao
(China), Malaysia, Nauru, Niue, the Philippines, the Seychelles,
Singapore and Vanuatu.
 8.2 Objectives analysed and data collected
The research focused on the following objectives, considering the
different jurisdictions grouped according to their level of
‘proximity’ to the European Union:
- Objective A): analysis of the infiltration of financial centres
and offshore jurisdictions by organised criminal groups;
- Objective B): comparative analysis of legislation,
administrative controls and international co-operation
(understanding what and where the asymmetries are);
- Objective C): harmonisation of the differences in integrity
standards between EU and non-EU financial centres and
offshore facilities and the planning of remedies and common
policies of international co-operation to prevent their use by
criminal organisations for illicit purposes.
With reference to objective A) and B):
- the primary sources were:
§ replies to the questionnaires prepared by the three
research units and sent via Interpol to respondents
(Police, Justice, Central Bank and Finance authorities) in
most of the jurisdictions mentioned (see Annex B to the
report for the full text of the questionnaires). At the
time of writing, of the 35 questionnaires sent out33 (to
48 jurisdictions), 21 replies34 had been received since
July 1999.
                                                
32 Owing to difficult political conditions, it was not possible to develop analysis of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
33 These jurisdictions are, in alphabetical order: Albania, Andorra, Aruba, the Bahamas,
Barbados, the Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, the Cayman Islands,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Hungary, Jamaica, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Poland,
Puerto Rico, Romania, the Russian Federation, San Marino, the Seychelles, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Ukraine.
34 Replies were received from, in alphabetical order: Andorra, the Bahamas, Barbados,
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Gibraltar, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Monaco, Poland, Romania, Russia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland
and Ukraine.
Euroshore
43
Some jurisdictions failed to receive the
questionnaires because they did not have an Interpol
central national bureau. Another primary source
consisted of the reactions by the various
jurisdictions35 to their country profiles (which were
sent to each of them), and this enabled the
information in Annex A to be checked for accuracy
and updated;
§ the replies to a questionnaire drawn up by
TRANSCRIME - University of Trento on company law
regulations and sent to members of the International
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in
most of the jurisdictions considered36.
- the secondary sources were: white literature (research reports,
scientific and professional journals), police and press reports.
In order to minimise the risk that information might be out-of-
date or invalid, the results of the analysis on objectives A) and B)
were sent to various jurisdictions to obtain their reactions. Their
replies have been incorporated, when possible, in Annex A.
It should be immediately noted that it was not possible to
conduct satisfactory analysis of legislation ‘in practice’. Those
parts of the questionnaire relating to the implementation of
                                                
35 The jurisdictions which commented on their country profile were, in alphabetical
order: Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey, Hong Kong, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Montserrat, Poland, the Principality of Monaco, Romania, the Russian Federation, San
Marino, Switzerland, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Ukraine.
36 We thank, in alphabetical order, the following institutions for their co-operation:
- Austrian Securities Authority, Austria;
- Securities Commission of the Bahamas, Bahamas;
- Bermuda Stock Exchange, Bermuda;
- Danish Financial Supervisory Authority, Denmark;
- Danish Commerce and Companies Agency, Denmark;
- Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, Germany;
- The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, Hong Kong;
- Hungarian Banking and Capital Market Supervision, Hungary;
- Budapest Stock Exchange, Hungary;
- Central Bank of Ireland, Ireland;
- Lithuanian Securities Commission, Lithuania;
- Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier, Luxembourg;
- Kredit Tilsynet, The Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission of Norway,
Norway;
- Riga Stock Exchange, Latvia;
- Warsaw Stock Exchange, Poland;
- Bucharest Stock Exchange, Romania;
- Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore;
- Bolsa de Madrid, Spain;
- SWX Swiss Exchange, Switzerland;
- STE, Securities Board of The Netherlands, The Netherlands;
- Securities and Stock Market State Commission, Ukraine;
- Financial Services Authority, United Kingdom.
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legislation were not filled out in sufficient detail by respondents.
The procedure used to select relevant case studies in Section 12
does not substantially change the final conclusions of this report,
the main concern of which is to analyse the formal regulatory
systems characteristic of the jurisdictions selected. The authors of
the report are aware of the lag between regulation and its
implementation and that analysis of the law ‘in action’ produces
interesting results that should be added to those from analysis of
the law ‘in the books’. At the same time, the authors believe that
better understanding of the differences among regulatory systems
could identify some relevant problems. The enactment of
legislation and regulation is the beginning of a process that passes
through numerous stages before implementation. This report
concentrates on the first stage in that it analyses the asymmetries
in regulation characteristic of offshore and onshore jurisdictions.
With reference to objective C):
- The three research units, together with experts in the various
fields covered by this report, discussed the general
framework of recommendations and jointly drafted feasible
recommendations.
- The results of the analysis carried out on objectives A) and B)
were incorporated into the country profiles (Annex A to this
report) and are set out in Table 1 (see Section 9.2), which
collects the results of the analysis in order to display the
regulatory asymmetries among different jurisdictions.
- After quantifying these asymmetries, the research considered
a number of case studies in which these asymmetries were
highlighted (see Section 12).
- The results of the analysis on objective C) have been
included in this report. The framework within which
recommendations were developed reflected the research
design and consisted of: the problems (asymmetries in
regulation); the rationale and background; the aim; the three
actions; the group of jurisdictions to which the
recommendations are addressed; the ways in which EU
Institutions may implement them; and the text of the
complete recommendation.
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9. Findings  9.1 Country Profiles (The detailed analysis of the countries considered by this
research is at Annex A)
Annex A to this report contains the complete analysis of the
countries selected. In each jurisdiction the following items were
considered: existing organised crime activities, present tax laws
and regulations, company law and regulations, criminal law and
criminal procedure, and the instruments of international co-
operation agreed and used.
A number of inferences can be drawn from the analysis.
There is a substantial difference in the extent to which organised
crime is present in the various countries considered. Some of
them, in particular those in central and eastern Europe, are
marked by the presence of tightly organised criminal groups
engaged in a variety of criminal activities, one of which is money
laundering. The majority of the remaining jurisdictions, however,
do not appear to have significant problems with local criminal
groups (with the exception of certain groups used to transit drugs
being smuggled into the US or the countries of Western Europe).
Criminal organisations are significantly exploiting the vast
majority of financial centres and offshore facilities for money
laundering purposes. Although the information available on the
money laundering activities of criminals is very often meagre, it is
nevertheless possible to ascertain that the services provided by
these countries (e.g. offshore companies, special tax regimes, low
banking scrutiny standards, etc.) are being used by launderers.
With virtually no exception, the information gathered shows that
all jurisdictions are highly attractive to criminals, all the more so
since the advent of electronic money transactions, which have
enormously speeded up money movements. In most financial
centres and offshore facilities, banks and other financial
institutions have already adopted electronic banking services and
Internet web sites, thereby enabling investors to move their
capital to these ‘safe’ jurisdictions even more rapidly and easily.
At the same time, the impressively small number of law
enforcement operations and cases of money laundering
investigated in these countries testifies to their unwillingness ‘to
ask too many questions’ about the legitimate origin of the capital
concerned.
With reference to the regulation of companies, for instance as
regards Group 1 (offshore jurisdictions close the to European
Union), the regulation of exempt companies differs significantly
among jurisdictions: such companies are not subject to the same
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requirements on incorporation and the functions that they may
perform, and in which locations.
The integrity standards related to company law are relatively lax in
all three Groups. Numerous countries do not require disclosure
of the identity of the beneficial owner of a company at the
moment of its incorporation. The same applies to shareholders
and directors. Moreover, even in those countries in which such
disclosure is compulsory, the use of nominee shareholders and
directors is allowed. Furthermore, most of the jurisdictions on
which we have information permit the issuing of bearer shares,
and many of them do not require the filing and publication of
financial statements.
Trusts can be easily exploited for money laundering purposes,
considering the rules governing them in the countries surveyed.
Many jurisdictions, for example, do not require the disclosure of
the identity of the beneficiary and of the settlor. Sometimes a
trust company acting as a trustee is not even required to obtain a
governmental licence to operate, and consequently no control is
exerted over the professional integrity of the trust administrator.
In some jurisdictions, the trustee is able to move the trust from
one jurisdiction to another in the event of criminal investigation
(‘flee clause’).
The same situation of persisting discord among countries is
apparent in banking law. Although it seems impossible in many
Group 1 jurisdictions to open a bank account without indicating
the beneficial owner, it is nevertheless possible to circumvent the
rule. In some countries, indeed, for instance Liechtenstein or the
Cayman Islands, a declaration of the person opening the account
(e.g. a lawyer) stating that he has positively ascertained the identity
of his/her client is all that is required. The name of the ultimate
beneficial owner is therefore unknown to the institution operating
the bank account, a problem exacerbated by bearer shares when
the account signatories remain the same. Moreover, large
differences among identification requirements still persist.
Most of the countries under consideration, particularly those
belonging to Group 1, have no controls on cross-border
movements of capital. Nor do they have a central monetary
authority to supervise the soundness of their financial systems.
Although money laundering is a criminal offence in most of the
countries considered (there are a few exceptions, such as
Moldova, which has a draft law), the list of the predicate offences
is far from being harmonised.
There exist very significant cases of countries still without
mandatory identification requirements (Slovakia and Jamaica), and
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no concordance is apparent even in the financial institutions that
should be subject to these requirements. The law in Poland or in
Montserrat, for example, continues to apply only to the banking
sector, while Liechtenstein expressly excludes some kinds of
company, namely the Anstalt and the Stiftung, from the
identification and suspicious transactions reporting requirements
imposed by its anti-money laundering legislation. The same
applies to suspicious transaction reporting, which is not
mandatory in all jurisdictions, being only voluntary in the Cayman
Islands and in Jamaica, for instance, and entirely lacking in
Andorra, Moldova, and the Russian Federation.
International co-operation seems in theory to be possible in all
countries, but only for specific offences and often only on a dual
criminality basis. Since many offshore jurisdictions do not
envisage fiscal offences, foreign requests for co-operation during
criminal investigations are often refused.
 9.2 Table 1
These findings, which constitute important information on the
regulatory structures of financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions, have been set out in a synoptic table which
summarises the main questions asked by the questionnaires. The
replies were extracted by the primary and secondary sources (see
Section 8 on methodology and data collection). With reference to
company law this information was integrated with data from
other sources.37 It was impossible to introduce this integration  in
the country profiles provided in Annex A. For this reason, the
information contained in this report in the section dedicated to
company law is updated in respect to that contained in the Annex
A (country reports).
A further disclaimer on the information provided is necessary.
Although the analysis was cross-checked, amongst other things by
sending the results to the jurisdiction concerned, the information
contained in this report with reference to certain items in some
                                                
37 As far as company law is concerned in particular, the following have been key sources
of information:
- Company Law in Europe, Buttherworths, London, 1999;
- the answers to a questionnaire on company law regulations drawn up by
TRANSCRIME and sent to members of the International Organisation of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in most of the jurisdictions considered;
- cross-checked data from companies offering offshore services on the Internet (Ocra
– http://www.ocra.com; Finor Associates Ltd. – http://www.finor.com;
International Company Services Limited – http://www.icsl.com, American
Offshore Consultants Limited);
- Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Modern Company Law for a Competitive
Economy, DTI, London, August 1998;
- Centre for Law and Business, Faculty of Law, University of Manchester, Company
Law in Europe: Recent Developments, produced for the Department of Trade and
Industry, February 1999.
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jurisdictions may misrepresent their present situations. If this is
the case, the authors apologise to the jurisdiction concerned.
Groups 0, 1, 2 and 3 represent the four groups identified for the
purpose of this research project and described in Section 8.
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CRIMINAL LAW
1. Is money laundering punished in your criminal system?
2. Does the legislation provide for a list of crimes as predicate offences of money laundering?
3. Do predicate offences of money laundering cover all serious crimes?
4. Do predicate offences of money laundering cover all crimes?
5. Is there a provision allowing confiscation of assets for a money laundering offence?
6. Are there any special investigative bodies or any special means of investigation (e.g. electronic surveillance, undercover
operations, etc.) in relation to money laundering offences?
Group 0 1
Money
laundering
punished
2
List of crimes
3
All serious
crimes
4
All crimes
5
Confiscation
6
Existence of a
special body or
means of
investigation
Austria Yes Yes* Yes No Yes Yes
Belgium Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Denmark Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Finland Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
France Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Germany Yes Yes* Yes No Yes Yes
Greece Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Ireland Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Italy Yes Yes* Yes No Yes Yes
Luxembourg Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
The
Netherlands
Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Portugal Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Spain Yes Yes* Yes No Yes Yes
Sweden Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
United
Kingdom
Yes Yes* Yes No Yes Yes
Criminal law – Explanation of questions
Yes*: The answer Yes* has been assigned only for analytical purposes (quantification of asymmetries in Section n. 10
and Annex C). Answers to questions nn. 2, 3 and 4 should be considered as a continuum from the minimum
requisite (list of crimes) to the maximum one (all crimes), going through an intermediate option (all serious crimes).
This means that the authors have assigned Yes* to the answer of those jurisdictions which have equally been
assigned a positive answer in the subsequent question. For instance, if Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland or
Sweden have answered ‘Yes’ to the question regarding the ‘all crimes’ option, the authors have equally assigned
‘Yes*’ in the previous boxes, referring respectively to the ‘list of crimes’ and to ‘all serious crimes’. Such decision has
been taken although authors are aware that Belgian, Finnish or Swedish legislation could not actually have a ‘list of
crimes’ in their legislation. This option has been necessary in order to allow the conversion of qualitative answers
into numbers, using a dichotomic model (Yes=1; No=0). Consequently, Yes* has only an analytical purpose and
cannot be used for description of the situation in the jurisdiction considered.
Question 1: An answer was deemed to be ‘yes’ when the criminal system of the jurisdiction considered punishes
money laundering (either as an autonomous crime or not, i.e. “receiving of stolen goods”).
Question 2: An answer was deemed to be ‘yes’ when the criminal system of the jurisdiction considered envisages a
list of crimes as predicate offences of money laundering.
Question 3: An answer was deemed to be ‘yes’ when the criminal system of the jurisdiction considered foresees as a
predicate offence of money laundering any crime punished with an imprisonment over a fixed period of time.
Question 5: An answer was deemed to be ‘yes’ when the criminal system of the jurisdiction considered provides for
the  confiscation of property laundered, proceeds from, instrumentalities used or intended for use in the commission
of any money laundering offence, or property of corresponding value (FATF Recommendation 7).
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Group 1 1
Money
laundering
punished
2
List of crimes
3
All serious
crimes
4
All crimes
5
Confiscation
6
Existence of a
special body or
means of
investigation
Andorra Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Anguilla No No No No No No
Aruba Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Bermuda Yes Yes* Yes No Yes Yes
BVI Yes Yes* Yes No Yes Yes
Cayman
Islands
Yes Yes* Yes No Yes No
Cyprus Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
French West
Indies
Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Gibraltar Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Guernsey Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Isle of Man Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Jersey Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Liechtenstein Yes Yes* Yes* Yes Yes -
Malta Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Montserrat Yes Yes No No - No
Netherlands
Antilles
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Monaco Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
San Marino Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Switzerland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turks &
Caicos Islands
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Group 2 1
Money
laundering
punished
2
List of crimes
3
All serious
crimes
4
All crimes
5
Confiscation
6
Existence of a
special body or
means of
investigation
Albania Yes - - - - Yes
Bulgaria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Czech
Republic
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Estonia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hungary Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Latvia Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Lithuania Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Moldova No No No No No No
Poland Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Romania Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Russian
Federation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Slovakia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ukraine Yes Yes No No - -
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Group 3 1
Money
laundering
punished
2
List of crimes
3
All serious
crimes
4
All crimes
5
Confiscation
6
Existence of a
special body or
means of
investigation
Bahamas Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Barbados Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Cook Islands Yes Yes Yes No - -
Hong Kong
(China)
Yes Yes Yes No Yes -
Jamaica Yes Yes No No Yes -
Macao (China) Yes Yes Yes No - -
Malaysia
(Labuan)
No No No No No No
Nauru No No No No No No
Niue No No No No No No
Philippines No No No No No No
Puerto Rico Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seychelles Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Singapore Yes Yes No No Yes -
Vanuatu Yes Yes Yes No - -
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ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
1. Is there an anti-money laundering law in the jurisdiction?
2. Are banks covered by the anti-money laundering law?
3. Are other financial institutions covered by the anti-money laundering law?
4. Are non-financial institutions covered by the anti-money laundering law?
5. Are other professions carrying out a financial activity covered by the anti-money laundering law?
6. Are there identification requirements for the institutions covered by the anti-money law?
7. Is there suspicious transactions reporting?
8. Is there a central authority (for instance, a Financial Intelligence Unit) for the collection of suspicious transactions
reports?
9. Is there any co-operation between banks or other financial institutions and police authorities?
Group 0 1
Anti-money
laundering
law
2
Banks
3
Other
Financial
4
Non
Financial
5
Other
profes-
sions
6
Identification
requirements
7
Repor-
ting
8
Central
authority
9
Co-
operation
Austria Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Belgium Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Finland Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
France Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Greece Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ireland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Luxembourg Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The
Netherlands
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Portugal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sweden Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
United
Kingdom
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Administrative regulations – Explanations of questions
Question 1: An answer was deemed to be ‘yes’ when the jurisdiction considered has specific regulations intended to
protect the financial sector from the laundering of illicit proceeds.
Questions 2-3-4-5: An answer was deemed to be ‘yes’ when in the jurisdiction considered banks/other financial
institutions/non-financial institutions/other professions have special obligations under anti-money laundering law.
In this context, the term ‘other financial institutions’ refers to those institutions undertaking one or more of the
operations included in numbers 1-12 and 14 of the list annexed to Directive 89/646/EEC, and to those financial
activities listed in the Annex to FATF Recommendation 9. The category ‘non-financial institutions’ refers to those
subjects such as jewellers and dealers in precious stones and metals, supermarkets, the real estate sector. ‘Other
professions’ include external accountants and auditors; notaries and other independent legal professions when
assisting or representing clients in the: buying and selling of real property or business entities, handling of client
money, securities or other assets, opening or managing bank, savings or securities accounts, creation, operation or
management of companies, trusts or similar structures, execution of any other financial transactions.
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Group 1 1
Anti-money
laundering
law
2
Banks
3
Financial
4
Non
Financial
5
Profes-
sional
6
Identification
requirements
7
Repor-
ting
8
Central
authority
9
Co-
operation
Andorra Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Anguilla No No No No No Yes - - -
Aruba Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bermuda Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BVI Yes - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cayman
Islands Yes - - - - No No Yes -
Cyprus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
French West
Indies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gibraltar Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Guernsey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Isle of Man Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Jersey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Liechtenstein Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Malta Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes
Montserrat Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes -
Netherlands
Antilles
Yes - - - - Yes No Yes Yes
Monaco Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
San Marino Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Switzerland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turks &
Caicos
Islands
Yes Yes No No No - Yes Yes -
Group 2 1
Anti-money
laundering
law
2
Banks
3
Other
Financial
4
Non
Financial
5
Other
profes-
sions
6
Identification
requirements
7
Repor-
ting
8
Central
authority
9
Co-
operation
Albania No No No No No Yes Yes No -
Bulgaria Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Czech
Republic Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Estonia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hungary Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latvia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lithuania Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No
Moldova No No No No No No No Yes No
Poland Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes
Romania Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Russian
Federation No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Slovakia Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ukraine No No No No No Yes No No Yes
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Group 3 1
Anti-money
laundering
law
2
Banks
3
Other
Financial
4
Non
Financial
5
Other
profes-
sions
6
Identification
requirements
7
Repor-
ting
8
Central
authority
9
Co-
operation
Bahamas Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Barbados Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cook Islands No No No No No No No No No
Hong Kong
(China)
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jamaica Yes - - - - No No No -
Macao
(China)
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No -
Malaysia
(Labuan)
No No No No No Yes No No -
Nauru No No No No No No No No -
Niue No No No No No No No No -
Philippines No No No No No Yes No No No
Puerto Rico Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seychelles Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Singapore Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No -
Vanuatu Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes - -
Euroshore
55
BANKING LAW
1. Is there a prohibition to open a bank account without indicating the identity of the beneficial owner?
2. Are there limits to bank secrecy in case of criminal investigation and prosecution?
Group 0 1
Bank account
2
Bank secrecy
Austria No Yes
Belgium Yes Yes
Denmark Yes Yes
Finland Yes Yes
France Yes Yes
Germany Yes Yes
Greece Yes Yes
Ireland Yes Yes
Italy Yes Yes
Luxembourg Yes Yes
The Netherlands Yes Yes
Portugal Yes Yes
Spain Yes Yes
Sweden Yes Yes
United Kingdom Yes Yes
Group 1 1
Bank account
2
Bank secrecy
Andorra Yes Yes
Anguilla - No
Aruba Yes No
Bermuda - -
BVI - Yes
Cayman Islands - Yes
Cyprus Yes Yes
French West Indies Yes Yes
Gibraltar Yes Yes
Guernsey Yes Yes
Isle of Man Yes Yes
Jersey Yes Yes
Liechtenstein - No
Malta No No
Montserrat - Yes
Netherlands Antilles Yes Yes
Monaco Yes Yes
San Marino Yes Yes
Switzerland No Yes
Turks & Caicos Islands - Yes
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Group 2 1
Bank account
2
Bank secrecy
Albania - -
Bulgaria Yes Yes
Czech Republic No Yes
Estonia Yes Yes
Hungary No Yes
Latvia Yes Yes
Lithuania Yes Yes
Moldova Yes Yes
Poland Yes Yes
Romania - -
Russian Federation No Yes
Slovakia No No
Slovenia Yes Yes
Ukraine No Yes
Group 3 1
Bank account
2
Bank secrecy
Bahamas Yes Yes
Barbados - Yes
Cook Islands - -
Hong Kong (China) Yes Yes
Jamaica - -
Macao (China) Yes -
Malaysia (Labuan) - -
Nauru - -
Niue - -
Philippines No No
Puerto Rico Yes Yes
Seychelles Yes Yes
Singapore - No
Vanuatu - -
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COMPANY LAW
1. Is a minimum share capital of at least 1000 Euro required for limited liability companies?
2. Is there a prohibition to issue bearer shares in limited liability companies?
3. Is there a prohibition to have legal entities as directors of limited liability companies?
4. Does a registered office exist for limited liability companies?
5. Is there any form of annual auditing (at least internal) for limited liability companies?
6. Does a shareholder register exist for limited liability companies?
Company law – Explanations of questions
The questions on company law refer to ‘limited liability companies’. In each jurisdiction, the researchers considered
‘limited liability companies’ to be all those corporate legal entities whose shareholders are liable for an amount
equalling only their shareholding. It may happen that in a given jurisdiction there is more than one type of limited
liability company, each regulated in a different manner. In this case, the researchers answered ‘no’ to a question when
there was at least one type of limited liability company for which the requirement referred to by that question
(minimum share capital, prohibition on issuing bearer shares, etc.) was lacking. For instance, if in a given jurisdiction
there were two types of limited liability company, one subject to annual auditing and the other not, the answer to
question number 5 was ‘no’. This was because the researchers assumed that criminals exploit every loophole of the
company law in a given jurisdiction (in this case the loophole is the non-transparent type of company), preferring the
type of company where one of the requirements (minimum share capital, prohibition of bearer shares, existence of
registered office, etc.) referred to by the question is lacking.
The six questions are intended to highlight the level of transparency of limited liability companies. The researchers
tried to identify company features that might represent incentives for criminals to use a corporation as a shield for
money laundering operations. A ‘no’ answer identifies a loophole in a jurisdiction’s company regulations that might
be exploited by criminals.
Question 1: The lower the minimum share capital, the more likely it is that criminals will incorporate companies in
order to conceal illicit operations.
Question 2: The presence of bearer shares may facilitate money launderers in two ways. Firstly, they may be used to
convert illicit money into negotiable and anonymous instruments. Secondly, they grant anonymity to criminals
wishing to incorporate and govern a corporation.
Question 3: The presence of legal entities as directors is a device that enables criminals to determine the policies of a
corporation, reducing the possibility of detection.
Question 4: The presence of a registered office links the corporation to a particular location. It is an indication of the
seriousness of a corporation and it facilitates financial and law enforcement controls.
Question 5: The presence of an auditing process – at least internal - reduces the risks that criminals will exploit
corporations. This answer was deemed to be ‘yes’ when in the jurisdiction considered there is a specific requirement
of (at least) an internal auditing process, and this requirement cannot be eluded with an agreement among the
shareholders.
Question 6: The presence of a shareholder register is indicative of the transparency of a corporation because it allows
identification of the partners.
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Group 0 1
Minimum
Capital
required
2
Bearer shares
prohibited
3
Legal Entities
as Directors
prohibited
4
Existence of
Registered
Office
5
Annual (at least
internal) Auditing
required
6
Existence of
Shareholders
Register
Austria Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Belgium Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Denmark Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Finland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
France Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Germany Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Greece Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Ireland Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Luxembourg Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
The Netherlands Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Portugal Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spain Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Sweden Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
United Kingdom No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Group 1 1
Minimum
Capital
required
2
Bearer shares
prohibited
3
Legal Entities
as Directors
prohibited
4
Existence of
Registered
Office
5
Annual (at least
internal) Auditing
required
6
Existence of
Shareholders
Register
Andorra - No Yes Yes No Yes
Anguilla No No No Yes No Yes
Aruba Yes No No Yes - No
Bermuda No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
BVI No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cayman Islands No No No Yes No Yes
Cyprus No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
French West
Indies
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Gibraltar No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Guernsey No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Isle of Man No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jersey No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Liechtenstein Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Malta No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Montserrat - No - Yes No Yes
Netherlands
Antilles
Yes No No Yes No No
Monaco Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
San Marino Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Switzerland Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Turks & Caicos No No No Yes No No
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Group 2 1
Minimum
Capital
required
2
Bearer shares
prohibited
3
Legal Entities
as Directors
prohibited
4
Existence of
Registered
Office
5
Annual (at least
internal) Auditing
required
6
Existence of
Shareholders
Register
Albania - - - - No -
Bulgaria Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Czech Republic Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Estonia No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hungary Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latvia Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lithuania Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Moldova Yes No - No Yes -
Poland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Romania Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Russian
Federation Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Slovakia Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Slovenia Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Ukraine Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Group 3 1
Minimum
Capital
required
2
Bearer shares
prohibited
3
Legal Entities
as Directors
prohibited
4
Existence of
Registered
Office
5
Annual (at least
internal) Auditing
required
6
Existence of
Shareholders
Register
Bahamas No No No Yes Yes No
Barbados No Yes - Yes Yes Yes
Cook Islands Yes No No Yes No No
Hong Kong
(China)
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Jamaica No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macao (China) Yes - - Yes Yes Yes
Malaysia (Labuan) No Yes No Yes No Yes
Nauru - No - Yes - -
Niue No No No Yes No No
Philippines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puerto Rico Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seychelles No No No Yes No No
Singapore No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vanuatu No No No Yes No No
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INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
1. Is there a provision allowing extradition (at least of foreigners) for money laundering offences?
2. Is there a provision allowing to provide assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies in the investigation of money
laundering cases?
3. Is there a provision allowing law enforcement, judicial authorities, the FIU or other governmental departments to
respond to a request from a foreign country for financial records (bank records)?
4. Is there a provision allowing the sharing of confiscated assets for money laundering offences?
5. Has the 1988 UN Convention been ratified?
No* means that - notwithstanding a very deep search in the field of international co-operation – it has not been possible to find
indications of a positive answer for the jurisdiction considered. A negative answer has been therefore assumed.
Group 0 1
Extradition of
foreigners
2
Assistance to
foreign law
enforcement
provided
3
Response to
requests
4
Asset sharing
5
Ratification
of the 1988
UN
Convention
Austria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Belgium Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Finland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
France Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Greece Yes Yes Yes - Yes
Ireland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Luxembourg Yes - - - Yes
The Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Portugal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spain Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Sweden Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Group 1
1
Extradition of
foreigners
2
Assistance to
foreign law
enforcement
provided
3
Response to
requests
4
Asset sharing
5
Ratification
of the 1988
UN
Convention
Andorra Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Anguilla No Yes Yes No Yes
Aruba Yes Yes No* No Yes
Bermuda No* Yes No* No* Yes
BVI Yes Yes Yes No* Yes
Cayman Islands Yes Yes Yes No* Yes
Cyprus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
French West Indies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gibraltar Yes Yes Yes No* Yes
Guernsey Yes Yes Yes No* Yes
Isle of Man Yes Yes Yes No* No*
Jersey Yes Yes Yes No* Yes
Liechtenstein Yes Yes No* Yes No
Malta Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Montserrat Yes No* No* No* Yes
Netherlands Antilles Yes Yes Yes No* Yes
Monaco Yes Yes Yes No Yes
San Marino Yes Yes Yes No No
Switzerland Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Turks & Caicos Yes Yes Yes No* Yes
Group 2
1
Extradition of
foreigners
2
Assistance to
foreign law
enforcement
provided
3
Response to
requests
4
Asset sharing
5
Ratification
of the 1988
UN
Convention
Albania Yes No* No* No* No
Bulgaria Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Czech Republic Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Estonia Yes Yes Yes No* No
Hungary Yes Yes No No Yes
Latvia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lithuania Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Moldova No No Yes No Yes
Poland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Romania Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Russian Federation Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Slovakia Yes Yes No No Yes
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Ukraine Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Group 3 1
Extradition of
foreigners
2
Assistance to
foreign law
enforcement
provided
3
Response to
requests
4
Asset sharing
5
Ratification
of the 1988
UN
Convention
Bahamas Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Barbados Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cook Islands No No* No* No* No
Hong Kong (China) Yes Yes No* No* Yes
Jamaica Yes Yes Yes No* Yes
Macao (China) Yes No* No* No* Yes
Malaysia (Labuan) No No* No* No Yes
Nauru No No* No* No No
Niue Yes Yes Yes No No
Philippines No No* No* No Yes
Puerto Rico Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seychelles Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Singapore Yes Yes No* No* Yes
Vanuatu Yes Yes No* No* No
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10. Operational
Definitions of Criteria,
Standards and Indicators
for assessment of
regulatory asymmetries
This section describes the model used to analyse the data
collected in relation to the hypothesis considered, and it sets out
the analytical conclusions used later for the recommendations.
The initial hypothesis was that protection of the EU financial
system against the exploitation of offshore jurisdictions by
organised crime depends on the level of asymmetries among the
criminal, administrative, commercial, banking, international co-
operation regulations intended to ensure the financial integrity of
their economic systems. The purpose of the model is to show
where these asymmetries are (in which jurisdiction and in which
sector), to quantify them in order to provide better comparative
understanding of where the problems lie, and to indicate the
remedies that may be applied and how. The analysis proceeded as
follows.
1. Definition of the integrity standards of regulation, and identification of
indicators. ‘Asymmetry’ is defined here as the distance from a
fixed or standardised entity, which in this case is the integrity
of the financial system. Five standards were defined which, if
respected, should ensure the optimal integrity of a country’s
financial system and protect it against infiltration by organised
crime (henceforth ‘integrity standards’):
- the criminal and criminal procedure law standard;
- the administrative regulation standard;
- the banking law standard;
- the company law standard;
- the international co-operation standard.
For present purposes, ‘standard’ is defined as the ‘optimal
level of regulation’ in each of the different sectors of law. The
‘optimal level of regulation’ is the one that ensures the optimal
integrity of a country’s financial system. Each of the standards
was defined by a set of indicators, suitably weighted, and
corresponding to the questions used in Section 9 to compile
Table 1.38 The ‘optimal level’ for each sector of regulation was
attained when in a given country all the ‘indicators’ for each
                                                
38 The questions in this analytical part were answered by integrating the information in
Annex A with further data from other sources. As far as company law is concerned in
particular, the following were used:
- Company Law in Europe, Buttherworths, London, 1999;
- the answers to a questionnaire on regulations governing limited liability companies
drawn up by TRANSCRIME and sent to Stock Exchange Authorities,
- cross checked data from companies offering offshore services on the Internet (Ocra
– http://www.ocra.com; Finor Associates Ltd. – http://www.finor.com;
International Company Services Limited – http://www.icsl.com, American
Offshore Consultants Limited);
- Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Modern Company Law for a Competitive
Economy, DTI, London, August 1998;
- Centre for Law and Business, Faculty of Law, University of Manchester, Company
Law in Europe: Recent Developments, produced for the Department of Trade and
Industry, February 1999.
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sector were positive (i.e. the answers to the questions were
affirmative).
2. Quantification of the deviation of Groups 0, 1, 2, 3 from the integrity
standards in the five sectors of regulation. This second phase
involved quantification of the levels of deviation from or
compliance (the reverse) with the integrity standards displayed
by offshore jurisdictions and by EU member states. The
hypothesis at this stage was that the various groups identified
(Group 0, Group 1, Group 2 and Group 3) would exhibit
different levels of deviation from these standards.
The values 0 or 1 were assigned to each answer by each
jurisdiction. 0 denoted non-adherence to the indicator for the
standard considered, while 1 denoted adherence. Since the
various indicators contributed to the definition of each of the
integrity standards to differing extents, they were assigned
different weights in the definition of the standard, as
explained in detail in the sections on each standard. The
problem of unavailable data relative to a certain indicator for a
jurisdiction was solved - within each of the Groups
considered - by calculating the average score for the replies
given by the other jurisdictions in the Group for the same
indicator (so that the Group’s average score was assigned to
the missing datum). By following this procedure, for each
Group of jurisdictions, for each sector of law considered, it
was possible to calculate a total score – consisting of the
average of the scores assigned to each indicator – which
represented the level of deviation from a particular standard,
or, in other words, compliance with that standard.
3. Quantification of the deviation by Groups 1, 2, 3 from the EU integrity
level. In this third stage it was possible to determine the
difference in deviation from the integrity standards between
Groups 1, 2, 3 and Group 0 (EU member states). The
differential in scores among the Groups expressed the level of
regulatory asymmetry among them. The final phase of
recommendations started from the results of this analysis.
In order to facilitate understanding of the analysis procedure,
Annex C has been added to this report. This Annex explains
all the methodological steps followed and contains a detailed
list of the standards, their indicators and the value assigned to
each of them. Here the indicators and the corresponding
questions are summarised in the following table.
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STANDARDS, INDICATORS AND QUESTIONS
STANDARDS INDICATORS QUESTIONS WEIGHT
The existence of the crime of
money laundering
Is money laundering punished
in your criminal system?
30%
Does the legislation provide
for a list of crimes as predicate
offences of money laundering?
10%
Do predicate offences of
money laundering cover all
serious crimes?
10%
Width of money laundering
predicate offences
Do predicate offences of
money laundering cover all
crimes?
10%
Possibility of confiscation of
criminal proceeds
Is there a provision allowing
confiscation of assets for a
money laundering offence?
20%
Criminal and criminal procedure
laws standard
Existence of special investigative
bodies or special means of
investigations
Are there any special
investigative bodies or any
special means of investigation
(e.g. electronic surveillance,
undercover operations, etc.) in
relation to money laundering
offences?
20%
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STANDARDS INDICATORS QUESTIONS WEIGHT
Existence of an anti-money
laundering law
Is there an anti-money
laundering law in the
jurisdiction?
18%
Are banks covered by the anti-
money laundering law?
4.50%
Are other financial institutions
covered by the anti-money
laundering law?
4.50%
Are non-financial institutions
covered by the anti-money
laundering law?
4,50%
Width of the range of institutions
covered by the anti-money
laundering law
Are other professions carrying
out a financial activity covered
by the anti-money laundering
law?
4.50%
Existence of identification
requirements
Are there identification
requirements for the
institutions covered by the
anti-money legislation?
18%
Existence of a Central Authority
for the collection and analysis of
suspicious transactions' reports
Is there a central authority (for
Instance, a Financial
Intelligence Unit) for the
collection of suspicious
transactions reports?
18%
Existence of an obligation to
report suspicious transactions
Is there suspicious transactions
reporting?
10%
Administrative regulations standard
Possibility of co-operation between
financial institutions and police
authorities
Is there any co-operation
between banks or other
financial institutions and police
authorities?
18%
STANDARDS INDICATORS QUESTIONS WEIGHT
Possibility to open a bank
account without indicating the
beneficial owner
Is there a prohibition to open
a bank account without
indicating the beneficial
owner?
60%Banking law standard
Existence of limits to bank
secrecy
Are there limits to bank
secrecy in case of criminal
investigation and prosecution?
40%
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STANDARDS INDICATORS QUESTIONS WEIGHT
Existence of a minimum share-
capital for limited liability
companies:
Is a minimum share capital of
at least 1000 Euro required for
limited liability companies?
18%
Non-existence of the possibility to
issue bearer shares for limited
liability companies
Is there a prohibition to have
legal entities as directors of
limited liability companies?
18%
Non-existence of the possibility to
have legal entities as directors
Is there a prohibition to have
legal entities as directors of
limited liability companies?
18%
Existence of a registered office  Does a registered office exist
for limited liability companies?
 10%
Existence of a duty to audit
financial statements in limited
liability companies
 Is there any annual auditing (at
least internal) for limited
liability companies?
 18%
Company law standard
Existence of a share-holder
register
 Does a shareholder register
exist for limited liability
companies?
 18%
STANDARDS INDICATORS QUESTIONS WEIGHT
Existence of provisions enabling
extradition for money laundering
offences
 Is there a provision allowing
extradition (at least of
foreigners) for money
laundering offences?
 20%
Existence of provisions allowing
assistance to foreign law
enforcement agencies
 Is there a provision allowing to
provide assistance to foreign
law enforcement agencies in
the investigation of money
laundering cases?
 20%
Existence of provisions allowing
assistance to a request for
financial records
 Is there a provision allowing
law enforcement, judicial
authorities, the FIU or other
governmental departments to
respond to a request from a
foreign country for financial
records (bank records)?
 20%
Existence of the possibility to
share confiscated assets
 Is there a provision allowing
the sharing of confiscated
assets for money laundering
offences?
 20%
International co-operation standard
Ratification of the 1988 UN
Convention against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances
 Has the 1988 UN Convention
been ratified?
 20%
Euroshore
69
11. Analysis This section reports the results obtained by applying the model
for assessment of regulatory asymmetries. It conducts
comparative analysis of regulation in the various sectors of the
jurisdictions considered, grouped according to the criteria
outlined in Section 8.1.
The analysis had three main objectives:
- to quantify the level of deviation or the level of compliance
(which is the reverse of the level of deviation, since both
exhibit the distance between regulatory systems and the
standards) displayed by Groups 0, 1, 2 and 3 from and with
the integrity standards which operationally represent the
regulatory standards set by the international community;
- to quantify the level of deviation by Groups 1, 2 and 3 from
the European levels of integrity, which operationally represent
the average of regulation by the European Union member
states;
- to identify the sectors constituting significant problems for
the integrity of financial systems.
The analysis corresponds to the questions set out in Section 7:
- which Group of jurisdictions shows the greatest deviation
from the standards and in which sector/s?
- how wide are the asymmetries in each of these sectors and in
which group of jurisdictions are they present?
- what remedies can be suggested to reduce the risk of
exploitation and ensure closer protection of the EU financial
system?
 11.1 Deviation of Groups from the integrity standards
The first step of the analysis was quantification of the extent to
which the regulation of financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions deviates from the standards of integrity set by the
international community in order to protect financial systems
from exploitation by organised crime.
Using the methodology outlined in Section 8 and Annex C, for
every sector of regulation scores (from 0 to 1) were assigned to
each of the Groups considered. These scores expressed the extent
to which the regulatory systems of the Groups deviated from the
integrity standards. Table 2 shows the level of each Group’s
deviation: the closer the value to 0, the less the regulations deviate from
integrity standards.
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Table 2. Level of deviation of Groups from the integrity standards
Criminal and
Criminal
Procedure Law
Standard
Administrative
Regulations
Standard
Banking Law
Standard
Company Law
Standard
International
Co-operation
Standard
Group 0 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.02
Group 1 0.14 0.10 0.18 0.46 0.26
Group 2 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.26
Group 3 0.42 0.41 n.a. 0.47 0.47
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the results set out in Table 2.
Figure 1. Deviation of each Group from the integrity standards in each sector of regulation
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The following conclusions can be drawn:
- Group 0, apart from company law, seems to be almost in line
with all the integrity standards.
- Group 1 does not display significant deviation from criminal
and criminal procedure law and administrative regulations
standards, but it does so as far as banking (0.18 deviation),
company (0.46 deviation) and international co-operation (0.26
deviation) standards are concerned. Group 1 exhibits, after
Group 3, the highest level of deviation from the company law
standard (0.46 deviation).
- Group 2 presents what can be considered medium deviation
from all the standards. Administrative regulations (0.28
deviation), banking law (0.28 deviation) and company law
(0.30 deviation) are the most problematic sectors.
- Group 3 is the one most distant from the integrity standards
in each of the sectors of regulation considered, particularly as
far as the international co-operation standard is concerned.
- The company law standard is the one from which all the four Groups
(including the European Union) deviate most markedly. After company
law, international co-operation is another problematic sector.
 11.2 Deviation of Groups 1, 2 and 3 from the European Union integrity
level
Quantification of the level of deviation of the Groups from the
integrity standards also enables quantification of the level of
deviation of Groups 1, 2 and 3 from the level achieved by Group
0 (the European Union member states).
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Table 3. Level of deviation of Groups 1, 2 and 3 from the European Union integrity level
Criminal and Criminal
Procedure Law
Administrative
Regulations
Banking Law Company Law
International
Co-operation
Group 1 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.25 0.24
Group 2 0.08 0.26 0.24 0.08 0.24
Group 3 0.36 0.39 n.a. 0.26 0.46
Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the results set out in Table 3.
Figure 2. Level of deviation of Groups 1, 2 and 3 from the European Union integrity level
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The following conclusions can be drawn:
- Group 1 is distant from the EU integrity level as far as banking
(0.18 deviation), company (0.25 deviation) and international
co-operation standards (0.24) are concerned. In these sectors
the situation seems to be highly problematic;
- Group 2 is distant from EU integrity level as far as
administrative (0.26 deviation), banking (0.25 deviation), and
international co-operation standards (0.24 deviation) are
concerned;
- Group 3 is the most problematic, especially as far as
administrative (0.39 deviation), company (0.26 deviation) and
international co-operation (0.46 deviation) are concerned;
- international co-operation, company law and administrative
regulations are the sectors in which Groups 1, 2 and 3 display
the greatest deviation from the EU integrity level.
 
 
 11.3 General conclusions
 
These data furnish an idea of the distance between the level of
regulation of the countries considered and the integrity standards
which, if respected, should ensure the integrity of the financial
system of a jurisdiction by protecting it against infiltration by
organised crime. The data were aggregated by Group of
jurisdictions and sectors of regulation, and inspection of these
aggregates yields an immediate answer to the question put initially
by this research concerning asymmetries among regulatory
systems distinctive of the groups of financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions selected in respect to integrity standards and those
adopted by the European Union. What general conclusions can
be drawn from the analysis and what are its policy implications?
NOT ONLY OFFSHORE
The distinction between offshore and onshore is losing much of
its traditional meaning if construed as the opposition between
opacity and transparency. Competition to attract capital in search
of more favourable conditions traverses jurisdictions, with the
result that some offshore jurisdictions are moving toward tougher
criminal law legislation and international co-operation, and
somewhat more transparency (Group 1 and 2), while others
(Group 3) adhere to their traditions of lenient criminal law, non-
cooperation and opacity. At the same time countries with a long
traditions as financial centres display the same or lower standards
of regulation in respect to those officially termed ‘offshore’.
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The demand for offshore facilities is increasing as a result of
stringent controls on the taxation of enterprises and individuals in
the jurisdiction of origin. ‘Shopping around’ jurisdictions for the
purposes of tax planning is part of a globalised market just as
‘shopping’ for lower wages is a strategy adopted by enterprises to
reduce their costs. This demand for financial facilities in a global
market has created and is developing a trend which appears to
have less to do with the label ‘offshore/onshore’ and more with
the different levels of regulation openly offered in the
international market of financial services. Moral rhetoric is useless
when setting out to solve the problem of competition among
regulatory systems. The international community should
endeavour to ensure that tax planning does not turn into ‘harmful
tax competition’, just as it should prevent shopping for low wages
from turning into exploitation of the need to survive of a large
group of countries. The risk of exploitation by organised crime is
evident, and this risk grows more serious the more such
competition increases. Clear thresholds must be established in all
the sectors in which regulation attracts legitimate enterprises but
may also attract illicit ones. Who establishes what?
ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS WORK : INCOMING MEMBERS TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION ARE CHANGING THEIR CRIMINAL
LEGISLATION AND INTRODUCING FINANCIAL REGULATION.
The European Union has moved in this direction by introducing
clearly-stated clauses on financial and criminal legislation into the
Association Agreements concluded with countries seeking entry
to the European Union.39
The results of this research show quite clearly that, as offshore
and onshore compete to attract capital (and sometimes obtain
‘dirty’ capital as well), so jurisdictions belonging to Group 2 are
making their criminal legislation tougher and their financial
regulations more transparent. The influence of the European
Union is evident in this process, highlighting the positive role that
a regional institution such as the European Union can play in
improving the integrity standards of surrounding countries.
                                                
39 Since the text of the various agreements is nearly identical, the following Article 87 of
the Association Agreement with Slovenia is reported as an example:
“Article 87 Prevention of money laundering.
1. The parties agree on the necessity of making every effort and cooperating in order to prevent the use of
their financial systems for laundering of proceeds from criminal activities in general and drug offences in
particular.
2. Cooperation in this area shall include administrative and technical assistance with the purpose to
develop the implementation of regulations and efficient functioning of the suitable standards and
mechanisms to combat money laundering equivalent to those adopted by the Community and
international fora in this field, in particular the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)”.
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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROXIMITY WORKS: THE CLOSER
OFFSHORE JURISDICTIONS ARE TO EUROPEAN UNION THE LESS
THEY DEVIATE FROM THE INTEGRITY STANDARDS AND FROM
THOSE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Not only do Association Agreements work but also proximity to
the European Union seems to be beneficial. The results of the
analysis show that offshore jurisdictions belonging to Group 1
(with geographical, economic and political links with the
European Union) deviate less from integrity standards than do
the jurisdictions in Group 3 (offshore with no links with
European Union). With the exception of company law, all the
other sectors of regulation obtain better results than equivalent
sectors of Group 3. This signifies that proximity to the European
Union ‘works’ and that the measures adopted by such European
Union member countries as the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands to monitor those financial centres have yielded
positive results in terms of their adaptation to the rest of Europe.
In areas such as criminal law, criminal procedure and
administrative regulation, indeed, they achieve almost the same
levels as those of the European member states. This means that
more vigorous use of the political and economic links with these
countries would facilitate the harmonisation of their laws with
integrity standards in general and those of the European Union in
particular.
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM SHOULD BE MORE
TRANSPARENT BEFORE IT CAN CREDIBLY ASK OTHERS TO ‘CLEAN
UP THEIR ACT’
 
The first two conclusions assert that a regional approach works,
and that when offshore financial centres lie in the political and
economical periphery of the European Union a better level of
integrity is seen in their regulatory systems, with a consequent
reduction of the risk that organised crime may exploit their
financial facilities. This holds for almost all the regulatory systems
analysed, with the exception of one: company law. Comparing the
score for the deviation of the company law of European members
from the integrity standards reveals that EU company law
regulation has a 0.22 deviation from the integrity standards, which
is slightly less that the deviation by the Group 2 (0.30) and
significantly less than that by Group 1 (0.46) and Group 3 (0.47)
of offshore financial centres. Consequently, in at least one crucial
sector of regulation, the European Union member states have not
‘cleaned up their act’ before asking others to do so. This
‘cleaning-up’ should be accelerated for two reasons. Firstly for the
sake of credibility. The European financial system cannot ask
others to change their regulation with a view to improving the
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 integrity of their financial systems without itself having done so
first. Secondly, it is necessary because company law regulation is
the most essential factor in the transparency of the financial
systems.
 
 COMPANY LAW HAS A ‘DOMINO’ EFFECT INCREASING THE
OPACITY OF OTHER SECTORS’ REGULATIONS
Company law contributes more than other sectors of regulation
to the level of integrity of a financial system. Company law sets
the minimum of share capital for limited liability companies and
regulates the issue of bearer shares by them, the possibility that
legal entities may act as directors, the requirement of establishing
a registered office, and also the obligatory auditing of financial
statements in the case of limited liability companies and the
keeping of share-holder registers. According to the type of
regulation, company law produces the greater transparency or the
greater opacity of a financial system, thereby influencing the other
sectors and determining the effectiveness of police and
international judicial co-operation. This is the ‘domino’ effect of
company law: if this type of regulation seeks to maximise
anonymity in financial transactions, enabling the creation of shell
or shelf companies whose owners remain practically unknown
(because other companies own them), such anonymity will be
transferred to other sectors of law. Thus the names of the
ultimate beneficial owners or the beneficiaries of financial
transactions will remain obscure, which thwarts criminal
investigation and prosecution. Police co-operation requires
physical persons, not legal entities, and if company law maximises
anonymity, then the ineffectiveness of criminal law and police and
judicial co-operation is inevitable. The same effect arises in
banking law, where bank secrecy becomes a marginal issue
because of the anonymity of the companies operating bank
accounts under scrutiny. The ‘domino’ effect therefore influences
the other sectors, producing much of the opacity surrounding a
financial system. Consequently, the analysis suggests, if the
asymmetries are greater in this sector than in others, company law
is the point from which action to protect financial systems against
the risk of exploitation by organised crime should start, both in
Europe and elsewhere.
The policy implications of this result is that, whilst criminal law
and procedure have reduced the distance between the less
regulated and well regulated countries40, real changes would be
brought about by giving greater transparency to the rules on the
establishment of corporations and their operations. This would
enable law enforcement agencies and regulators to discover the
                                                
40 See Group 1.
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identities of the physical persons whose interests are being
managed. Rules of corporate governance combining efficiency
with transparency of ownership should be extended to encompass
a further kind of transparency: one targeted on the optimal level
of integrity. This form of transparency will reduce the risk of the
criminal exploitation of financial centres and offshore
jurisdictions, rendering international co-operation with law
enforcement agencies truly effective. Only in this case will
‘following the money trail’ yield investigative results that can be
used to prosecute criminals and disrupt their organisations.
Corporations and governments should be aware that facilitating
identification of the physical persons who operate in financial
markets will, in the long run, increase the transparency of financial
systems without impairing their efficiency. The less likely it is that
‘dirty money’ may pollute competition among enterprises and
infiltrate legitimate enterprises, the less it is likely that illicit
operators will proliferate, which would be to the advantage of
legitimate ones. Partnerships among corporations, regulatory and
law enforcement authorities and governments would foster this
process.
* * *
The analysis raised a number of points which relate mainly to
legislation. Given that a substantial period of time elapses
between legislation and its implementation, legislation is the
beginning of a process without which solutions to the problems
addressed by this research cannot be found. The next section will
show how the issue of offshore financial centres have attracted
the attention of law enforcement agencies. Only in this way, at the
present state of knowledge, is it possible to understand ‘offshores
in action’. In Section 13 the contents, policy implications and
strategies suggested by the analysis, and by the advice of
international experts, are translated into recommendations for
action by the European Union.
Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.
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12. Offshores in action:
case studies
The analysis carried out in the previous chapter was a mixture of
‘law in the books’ and ‘law in action’. Now, in order to afford a
clearer understanding of where the problems lie, and of how
financial centres and offshore jurisdictions are exploited by
organised crime groups, a number of case studies of international
law enforcement operations are presented. These cases studies41
have been selected in order to highlight the role played by
financial centres and offshore jurisdictions in criminal activities by
offering facilities vulnerable to exploitation by criminals. This
section also points up how those sectors of regulation which
display the greatest deviation from the standards considered in
section 11 are de facto those that are most exploited by criminals.
CASE 1. Operation Dinero: a case of undercover offshore services
to launder money42
MAIN FEATURES:
Drug criminal organisations; offshore banks; offshore shell
companies.
THE CASE:
This case concerns undercover operations conducted in an
offshore centre. Law enforcement agents set up fake banks and
fake shell corporations in an offshore centre in order to monitor
and detect money laundering activities. Without much difficulty,
they began servicing drug traffickers.
The operation was called Operation Dinero and began in the
DEA Atlanta Division in 1992 when DEA Special Agents
penetrated the Cali mafia and were commissioned by the
Colombian organised crime groups to arrange money pickups in
the United States and Europe. Phase I of the operation focused
on undercover money pickups which would reveal the connection
between drug trafficking and drug cell money groups in the
United States. Phase II focused on the DEA's operation of an
offshore private ‘Class B’ bank which served - at least in
appearance - as a legitimate source for laundering drug proceeds
by the unwitting Colombian mafia. With the expertise of the IRS,
DEA, and the British Government, a private bank was established
in Anguilla, British West Indies. Once the bank became
operational, the DEA worked undercover to promote the services
of the bank within the international criminal community, as well
as catering to the Cali mafia in Colombia. By operating the bank,
                                                
41 The following cases have been taken by different sources: investigative files, reports
of international organisations, answers given to questionnaires by some of the
jurisdictions considered, media news.
42 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Operation Dinero,
Internet address http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/briefing/4_5.htm
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DEA undercover agents gained credibility with the Cali mafia,
and in 1994, the bank began servicing drug trafficker accounts.
In addition, a number of undercover corporations were
established in different jurisdictions as multi-service ‘front’
businesses designed to supply ‘money laundering’ services such as
loans, cashiers checks, peso exchanges, wire transfers, or to
establish holding companies or shell corporations for the
trafficking groups. Ultimately, members of the Cali mafia engaged
the bank to sell three paintings: a Picasso, a Reynolds and a
Rubens. These paintings were seized by the DEA and IRS in
1994.
Operation Dinero spanned four countries and several U.S. states.
It resulted in 88 arrests, the seizure of approximately 9 tons of
cocaine, and the confiscation of well over $50 million in cash and
other property. The 2-year joint enforcement operation was co-
ordinated between the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Internal Revenue Service, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and international law
enforcement counterparts in the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy
and Spain.
LESSON TO LEARN:
The financial services offered by offshore jurisdictions appear to
be well known to organised drug traffickers. International co-
operation and intelligence sharing play a paramount role in the
fight against money laundering.
CASE 2. The Offshore Banking and U.S. Tax-Fraud Probe43
MAIN FEATURES:
Offshore banking; offshore shell companies; tax fraud and money
laundering.
THE CASE:
The following was a scam brought to light thanks to information
provided by a penitent former Cayman Islands banker, John M.
Mathewson, who enabled the U.S. authorities to open an
unprecedented window into the offshore-banking world. The
revelations of the banker led to a large number of investigations
and convictions.
The investigation started when investigators arrested Mathewson,
former owner of Guardian Bank & Trust (Cayman) Ltd., a
                                                
43 M. Allen, "Usa: Murky World of Offshore Banking Emerges in U.S. Tax-Fraud
Probe", in Wall Street Journal, 19 August 1999.
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defunct Cayman Islands bank. Mathewson, a U.S. citizen, had
been operating from the Caribbean island for more than a decade.
Federal agents arrested him at his San Antonio home in 1996 on
charges of laundering money for a U.S. ring which was selling
illegal cable-TV converter boxes. Mathewson collaborated with
the authorities, and as a direct result of his co-operation there are
now several dozen ongoing investigations involving money
laundering. He gave the investigators a list of all the bank's
depositors, numbering more than 1,000, along with the names of
the shell corporations that they were hiding behind. He also gave
agents a computer listing of bank transactions dating back 14
months, which was a gold mine of data on U.S. citizens using
offshore banking facilities, some of them presumably seeking to
evade U.S. taxes or break other laws.
Besides Mathewson himself, the U.S. has convicted more than a
dozen individuals who banked at Guardian. Mathewson had gone
well beyond the bounds of the law in assisting his clients.
According to his indictment, he helped the members of the cable-
piracy ring to disguise bribes intended for the security agent of a
cable-television concern, and set up foreign corporations to ‘lend’
clients their own money for real-estate purchases. The clients
would then repay the loans to themselves, fraudulently taking
deductions for mortgage interest payments and not reporting the
income. Prosecutors say Mathewson also issued Visa credit cards
to depositors in the name of shell corporations, which enabled
them to make purchases in the U.S. without leaving a paper trail.
Guardian's clientele ranged from hard-core criminals needing to
launder money to doctors and businessmen.
The banker aided prosecutors in several cases, including one
against Mark Vicini, a New Jersey computer executive, who
pleaded guilty in 1997 to evading $2.2 million in taxes. Vicini was
sentenced to five months in jail, five months of home detention,
and a $60,000 fine, and was also ordered to repay back taxes with
interest and penalties. Mathewson also helped in the prosecution
of Bartholomew D'Ascoli, a New Jersey orthopaedic surgeon who
deposited $394,000 with Guardian. Last August, Dr. D'Ascoli
pleaded guilty to tax evasion, and was sentenced to eight months
in prison, and a $15,000 fine.
LESSON TO LEARN:
There appear to be offshore banks which are established for the
prime purpose of undertaking illegal business. These same
offshore banks are able to exploit the low standards of company
law to incorporate companies which are subsequently used for
illicit purposes. The case suggests that steps should be taken to
improve the supervision of banks in offshore countries and to
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raise the standards of transparency in corporate law. There is also
the option of ‘turning’ key informants by means of plea
negotiations, sanctions and witness protection.
CASE 3. Cross border cash, laundering money through offshore
financial institutions44
FEATURES:
Drug traffickers; money laundering offshore through financial
institutions.
THE CASE:
Three suspicious transaction reports were received concerning
transactions at Danish banks in which large amounts of money
were deposited in accounts and then withdrawn shortly
afterwards as cash. The first report was received in August 1994,
and it concerned an account held by Mr. X. Upon initial
investigation, the subjects of the reports (X, Y and Z) were not
recorded in police databases as connected with drugs or any other
criminal activity. However, further investigation revealed that X
had imported more than 3 tones of hashish into Denmark over a
nine-year period. Y had assisted him on one occasion, whilst Z
had assisted in laundering the money. Most of the money was
transported by Z as cash from Denmark to Luxembourg, where
X and Z held 16 accounts at different banks, or to Spain and
subsequently Gibraltar, where they held 25 accounts. The receipts
from the Danish banks for the withdrawn money were used as
documentation to prove the legal origin of the money when it was
deposited at banks in Gibraltar and Luxembourg. It turned out
that sometimes the same receipt was being used at several banks
so that more cash could be deposited as ‘legal’ than had actually
passed through the Danish bank accounts.
X and Y were arrested, prosecuted and convicted for drug
trafficking offences and received sentences of two and six years of
imprisonment respectively. A confiscation order for the
equivalent of US$ 6 million was made against X. Z was convicted
of drug money laundering involving US$ 1.3 million and was
sentenced to one year and nine months of imprisonment.
LESSON TO LEARN:
Financial institutions should not treat proof of deposit in a bank
account as equivalent to proof of legitimate origin. Secondly, the
transporting of illegal proceeds in the form of cash across national
borders to certain countries is still a widely used money
                                                
44 Case entirely taken from Annexes to the 1997-1998 FATF Report on Money Laundering
Typologies, Case no. 3
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laundering method.
CASE 4. The role of offshore companies in the perpetration of
crimes and of offshore banks in laundering money45
MAIN FEATURES:
Offshore companies used to commit fraud; professionals
involved in money laundering activities through the use of
offshore bank systems.
THE CASE:
A large-scale international operation involving law enforcement
authorities in New York, Jersey and the British National Crime
Squad led to the arrest of a London magistrate and a solicitor
involved in a multi-million dollar fraud and international money
laundering. The share fraud, which cost investors around the
world more than $17m, was believed to be run from New York
but involved professionals in London, Jersey, Canada and Liberia.
The New York stock promoter accused of the crime set up 19
offshore companies in various financial havens in order to
perpetrate the fraud. These companies were supposedly registered
in Liberia and owned by a diplomat, who was bribed to sign blank
forms. In reality, however, they were managed from London and
used to buy stock from small firms. The prices of these stocks
was then inflated by fraudsters through a series of cross trades,
before being sold to unsuspecting investors who found
themselves with over-valued or even worthless shares. Money
from the fraud was then deposited by the criminals in bank
accounts at financial and offshore centres, namely Jersey and
Switzerland, in order to be laundered.
LESSON TO LEARN:
Offshore companies, given the ease with which they can be
incorporated and their low standards of transparency, are widely
used for criminal purposes. Banks in offshore centres are still
used to launder money.
                                                
45 M. Ricks, “International Fraud Squad Arrests London Lawyers”, in The Indipendent
(London), 28 June 1998.
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CASE 5. The role of offshore shell corporations and secretarial
companies in the laundering of money46
MAIN FEATURES:
Offshore shell corporations exploited to launder money.
THE CASE:
During 1995/96, financial institutions in a certain European
country made a number of suspicious transaction reports to its
financial intelligence unit. These reports identified large cash
deposits made to banks which were then exchanged for bank
drafts made payable to a shell corporation based and operated
from an Asian jurisdiction. The reports alleged that approximately
US$ 1.6 million were being transferred in this manner. The police
were simultaneously investigating a group in the country involved
in the importing of drugs, and in 1997 managed to arrest several
persons in the group, including the principal, who controlled the
company located in the Asian jurisdiction. These persons were
charged with conspiring to import a large amount of cannabis. A
financial investigation revealed that the principal had made
sizeable profits, a large percentage of which were traced. A total
of approximately US$ 2 million had been sent from the European
country to the Asian jurisdiction, and subsequently transferred
back to bank accounts in Europe, where it is now restrained.
Two methods were used to launder the money. The principal set
up a shell company in the Asian jurisdiction which was operated
there by a secretarial company on his instructions. The shell
company opened a bank account which was used to receive
cashiers orders and bank drafts purchased for cash in the country
of origin. The principal was also assisted by another person who
controlled (through the same secretarial company) several
companies. These companies were operated for both legitimate
purposes and otherwise. The accomplice laundered part of the
proceeds by sending the funds on to several other jurisdictions,
using non-face to face banking (computer instructions from the
original country) to do so. Seven persons including the principal
are now awaiting trial in the European country on charges of drug
trafficking, and the principal and three other persons face money
laundering charges.
LESSON TO LEARN:
This case clearly shows how desirable and easy it is for criminals
(even if not part of international organised crime) to use
corporate entities in other jurisdictions, and to transfer illegal
                                                
46 Case entirely taken from Annexes to the 1997-1998 FATF Report on Money Laundering
Typologies, Case no. 5
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proceeds through several further jurisdictions in order to disguise
their origins. It also demonstrates the ease with which company
incorporation services can be obtained, and shows that many of
the companies which sell shelf/shell companies, as well as the
secretarial companies that operate them, are not likely to concern
themselves about the purpose for which the shell company is
used. Thus highlighted is the need for financial institutions to
comprise a system which identifies suspicious transactions, not
just those performed at the front counter but also non-face to
face transactions, such as in this case. The amount of time taken
to conduct international financial investigations and to trace the
proceeds of crime transferred through several jurisdictions, make
the risk that the funds are dissipated concrete.
CASE 6. The drug cartel of Juan Garcia Abrego, and Raul Salinas'
money laundering allegations: a case of money laundering
through offshore shell companies
MAIN FEATURES:
Drug criminal organisations; money laundering through offshore
companies; corruption of banking officials.
THE CASE:
Juan Garcia Abrego, boss of Mexican drug trafficking, was
convicted in the United Sates in 1996. This was the first step in
uncovering interwoven circuits of corruption and money
laundering by Mexican officials.47 In a few years, Abrego’s
criminal organisation had amassed more than ten million dollars
from the exporting of cocaine and marijuana from Mexico and
their delivery to the American markets.48 Th group profited from
a web of contacts with Mexican public officials, from whom it
obtained the help necessary to cover the transferring of money
abroad to be laundered. Among Abrego’s ‘special friends’ were
the brother of the President of the Mexican Republic, Raul
Salinas, currently being investigated by the Mexican police, and
the Mexican Attorney General Mario Ruiz Massieu. The United
States government seized 9 million dollars belonging to Massieu
deposited in the Texas Commerce Bank of Houston, maintaining
that the money consisted of bribes paid by Abrego.49 Officials of
the American Express Bank International were also investigated
on suspicion of involvement in the money laundering operation.
                                                
47 Money Laundering Alert, “Conviction of Drug Lord Aids Salinas Inquiry”,
November 1996; A. Zarembo, “A verdict at Last – But the Case is Not Closed”, in
Newsweek, Internet address
http://newsweekinteractive.org/nw…4_99a/printed/int/wa/ov0604_1.htm.
48 Case no. H-93-CR-167-SS, So. Dis. Texas.
49 Money Laundering Alert, “Drug Lord , Now in U.S. Custody, Has Key to Mexican
Corruption”, February 1996.
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Antonio Giraldi, an employee of the bank, has been sentenced to
a ten years sentence for money laundering.
Giraldi was responsible for managing the bank accounts of a
certain Ricardo Aguirre, who turned out to be a money launderer
acting on behalf of Abrego.
The most sensitive aspect of the case was the alleged involvement
of Raul Salinas, brother of the Mexican President,50 by exploiting
his position as a public official in a government agency, Salinas
apparently took bribes amounting to millions of dollars from
entrepreneurs and drug traffickers in exchange for favours which
facilitated money laundering and which, obviously, were contrary
to his official duties. It seems that Salinas transferred around 100
million dollars between 1992 and 1994 by exploiting a private
relationship with Citibank of New York. These illicit funds were
transferred from Citibank of Mexico and Citibank of New York
to private banking accounts in Citibank, London and Citibank,
Switzerland.51 In order to ensure that this money reached these
final destinations, its origin was disguised by various means,
including the creation of offshore corporations to be used as shell
companies. In order to finalise the scam, Citibank officers:
- used Cititrust (Cayman) to set up an offshore private
investment company named Trocca to hold Salinas’ assets,
and also opened investment accounts at Citibank London and
Citibank Switzerland;
- did not adopt the ‘know your customer policy’ for Salinas
although obliged to do so;
- allowed Salinas’ wife to use another name to initiate fund
transfers in Mexico;
- had funds wired from Citibank Mexico to a Citibank New
York concentration account (in which funds from various
sources were commingled), before sending them to Trocca's
offshore Citibank investment accounts.
To be noted is the role played by Trocca company - a shell
company established by Citibank New York in the Cayman
Islands. Citibank set up this offshore shell company through
Cititrust (Cayman), which had at its disposal several dormant
private investment companies to be allocated to clients when
necessary. The company was incorporated in the Cayman Islands,
the country in which all the documentation linking Salinas to
                                                
50 This case is still under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice, and by
Mexican and Swiss judicial authorities.
51 The money, transferred to the Swiss bank, is currently frozen by the Swiss authorities
while they await proof of its illicit origin (Media Awarness Project, “Switzerland: Wire: $
132 Million Traced To Swiss In Salinas Case”, 25 April 1998, Internet address:
http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v98.n305.a05.html).
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Trocca was held and whose company regulations protect
document confidentiality.
Trocca's was therefore set up for reasons of close secrecy and tax
advantages. To give Salinas closer protection, Cititrust (Cayman)
set up three other shell companies to act as Trocca's board of
directors. As part of its private banking relationship with Salinas,
Citibank opened two accounts for Trocca (one at Citibank
London and one at Citibank Switzerland). According to Citibank
officials, Citibank London had no documentation to show that
Salinas was Trocca's ultimate beneficial owner.52
LESSON TO LEARN:
Offshore companies are exploited as shields to cover the
identities of the real beneficial owners of bank transactions.
Methods with which to require banks to ascertain the ultimate
beneficial owners of transactions should be explored.
Corporations located in offshore countries should be carefully
monitored. The corporate law of offshore jurisdictions should be
adjusted to eliminate low standards of transparency. Attention
should be paid to the possible dangers arising from close
customer-banker relationships in private banking.
CASE 7. The role of professionals in laundering money offshore:
lawyers53
MAIN FEATURES:
Professionals laundering money on behalf of their clients; use of
professional accounts in offshore centres; use of credit cards to
launder money.
THE CASE:
A prominent attorney operated a money laundering network
which used sixteen domestic and international financial
institutions, many of them located in offshore jurisdictions. The
majority of the attorney’s clients were law abiding citizens.
However, a certain number of them were engaged in various
types of fraud and tax evasion, and one client, indeed, had
committed an US$ 80 million insurance fraud. The attorney
charged his clients a flat fee to launder their money and to set up
annuity packages to hide the laundering. In the event of inquiries
by regulators or law enforcement officials, the attorney was
prepared to give the appearance of legitimacy to withdrawals from
                                                
52 GAO, Private Banking. Raul Salinas, Citibank, and Alleged money Laundering, UNGAO,
Washington, October 1998.
53 Case taken in its entirety from Annexes to the 1997-1998 FATF Report on Money
Laundering Typologies, Case no. 4.
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the ‘annuities’.
One laundering method used by the attorney was to transfer
funds from a client’s account into one of his own general
accounts in the Caribbean. This account was linked to the
attorney's name only, and he used it to commingle various client
funds, before moving portions of the funds accumulated in the
general account via wire transfers to accounts in other Caribbean
countries. When a client needed funds, the latter could be
transferred from these accounts to a U.S. account in the attorney's
name or the client's name. The attorney indicated to his clients
that they could ‘hide’ behind attorney-client privilege should they
ever be investigated.
The attorney also used credit cards to launder funds. He arranged
for credit cards in false names to be issued to his clients without
the issuer of the cards being aware of the true identities of their
recipients. When a client needed funds, s/he could use the credit
card to make cash withdrawals at any automated teller machine in
the United States. Once a month the Caribbean bank debited the
attorney's account for the charges incurred by his clients. The
attorney pleaded guilty to money laundering.
LESSON TO LEARN:
Banks and their employees should be alert to ‘layered’ wire
transfers with instructions of the type ‘for further credit to’, and
especially in the case of the correspondent accounts of ‘offshore
banks’. Suspicious transactions can then be identified and
reported. It is essential that banks should comply with ‘know your
customer’ requirements when issuing credit cards. In the case just
described, the banks issued credit cards to the attorney for further
issuance to his clients.
CASE 8. The European Bank of Antigua: money launderers going
offshore can be defrauded
MAIN FEATURES:
Bank in offshore jurisdiction offering anonymous services with
explicitly illegal purposes; incorporation of companies with the
aim of money laundering; Internet advertisements.
THE CASE:
This case is a clear example of how offshore facilities lend
themselves to use as vehicles for illegal activities. In this specific
instance, the individuals who sought to launder their money
ended up being defrauded by the bankers. To be noted is that all
the bank services offered (on line) by the fraudsters were for the
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purpose of laundering money using the coverage (secrecy and law
opacity) provided by offshore jurisdictions.
This case was brought to public attention in August 1997 by the
collapse of the European Union Bank (EUB).54 Initially registered as
an offshore bank (the East European International Bank Ltd.) in
the Caribbean island of Antigua on the 8 June 1994, this bank
changed its name to European Union Bank Ltd on 18 August
1994. It had been set up by two young Russian citizens already
with long criminal records:55 Alexander Konanykhine, a 30-year-
old financier who had escaped from Russia in 1992 under
accusation of defrauding eight million dollars from a bank that he
had founded, and a wanted person in the United States for
violation of the immigration rules; and Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
head of a huge financial and industrial empire cited by the
American press as one of 200 richest people in the world.
Three years before the bank went on-line with an aggressive
advertising campaign. Promoting itself as the first bank in
cyberspace, it promised ‘excellent interest rates’ in a “safe, tax-
exempt environment, with the maximum guarantee of privacy”.
Among the products on offer were one million dollar value
certificates of deposit on which the bank promised to pay an
interest of 9.91%.56 The bank’s advertisements on the Internet
were explicitly designed to attracting tax evaders or money
launderers. The bank offered a wide range of services, which were
accessible from any country: not only could customers open
numbered accounts (the identity of the customer was known only
to the bankers) or coded accounts (numbered accounts operating
by password rather than by signature), but they could also set up a
corporation on-line under Antigua corporate law, which does not
require the disclosure of shareholders or beneficial owners.
In 1997, EUB began to arouse suspicions, and various authorities
(among them the Bank of England and the State of Idaho) took
action to compel it to halt its saving and loan activity. The
competent authorities of Antigua officially enacted a ‘fraud alert’ in
August of the same year. It was too late, however, because at the
beginning of the month the two criminals had already shut down
the only counter at their small office, fired their five or six
employees, and made all their customers’ money as well as the
                                                
54 “EUB was all about money laundering and fraud. The bank has no location physically
or virtually. It was erased from the universe. It is the first virtual disappearance of a
bank”, D. Farah, “Antigua Internet Bank Vanishes Into Cyberspace: Suspected of
Money Laundering, Firm Closes Web Site, Bilking Patrons of Millions”, in The
Washington Post, 31 August 1997, pp. 30 ss.
55 J. Gould, “Gangster Bankers: A Young Russian’s Run-ins with Organised Crime and
Offshore Money Laundering”, in The Village Voice, 16 September 1997.
56 “Bank Collapse Illustrates the Dangers of Cyberspace”, in Electronic Payments
International, September 1997.
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bank’s website disappear. It is known for certain that only 100,000
dollars remained when the bank closed. The island authorities
have never revealed the overall amount of the money stolen or
made to disappear during the financial collapse, but the most
reliable sources put the sum at close to 10 million dollars.57
LESSON TO LEARN:
Offshore banks offering financial services on the Internet should
be carefully monitored, and anonymous accounts, or accounts for
which the names of the beneficial owners need not be disclosed,
should not be permitted. Corporate entities in other jurisdictions
are used to disguise the origins of illicitly gained money.
CASE 9. Loan back your own money
MAIN FEATURES:
Smuggling drug money; offshore companies; bearer shares.
THE CASE:
A Dutch criminal produced a quantity of the drug XTC and
transported it to the United Kingdom to be sold. The proceeds
amounted to around a million pounds sterling in the form of low
value banknotes. Given the obligation on British banks to report
suspicious transactions, the money was smuggled out of the UK
to the Netherlands by the same route that had been used to bring
the drug XTC into the country. Such a large amount of British
pounds would have attracted attention in the Netherlands, and if
deposited in a Dutch bank would have led to disclosure of the
‘unusual transaction’. For this reason, the money was smuggled to
another country in which there was no or hardly any obligation to
disclose transactions (a secrecy haven). The money was first taken
to a former East European country, where it was exchanged for
US dollars, which were paid into the account of a local enterprise
with bearer shares bought from an intermediary. A false invoice
(mentioning a management fee) was used to wire the money to
the account of an offshore Caribbean investment company
located in the Netherlands Antilles. The bearer shares of this
offshore company were held by an offshore company in Panama,
and the bearer shares of the latter company were held by a local
attorney at law.
In the meantime, the Dutch criminal had set up a limited
company in the Netherlands called Real Estate Investment, of
which he was the manager and the only shareholder. The purpose
of the company was to acquire money with which to buy and
                                                
57 Others instead report a sum of 6 millions dollars. See M.M. Plunkett, “Internet
Banking a Tangled Web for Investors”, in The Palm Beach Post, 26 October 1997.
Euroshore
91
manage real estate. The criminal contacted the Caribbean
investment company, from which his other company (Real Estate
Investment) borrowed a sum of money amounting to around one
million British pounds.
Using this money, Real Estate Investment bought a large office
building including a house. As the manager of the company, the
criminal now manages the office building, lives in the house and
drives an expensive company car. The office-building is rented out
to businesses, and out of the money paid for the offices the
manager draws a huge salary; the rest of the money is used to pay
off the loan (the interest on which qualifies for tax deduction). Of
course, the criminal is loaning his own (illegal) money and is the
beneficial owner of the Caribbean investment company.
LESSON TO LEARN:
The possibility of using offshore companies with bearer shares
makes the maintenance of secrecy and the loan-back of money
straightforward. Identification of the beneficial owners of
offshore companies is important for the deterrence of money
laundering.
CASE 10. Using the stock market to launder your money
MAIN FEATURES:
Stock market; Jersey (offshore) limited company; non-credit
institutions.
THE CASE:
A company doing business on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange
(AEX) had a criminal client. As a ‘non-credit institution’, the
company managed an account opened at the AEX bank – the so
called ‘Cash Association’ (KasAss) – on behalf of its client.
On several occasions, the company paid large amounts of money
into the criminal’s account at KasAss using a complex method to
disguise the money as legally acquired. The company was
specialised in transactions which speculated on a fall in stock
prices. To make a profit, stocks were sold in the longer term
without their actual possession (‘going short’). At the end of the
term, the stocks were bought just before they were to be sold. The
buyer hoped that he could buy the stocks at a price lower than the
one stipulated in the agreement and on which basis the stocks
could be sold.
Money was laundered by separating the profits and the losses. The
company made the separation by selecting the bills used to clear
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the stock transactions. When the positions were closed, and if the
company had made a profit, the bills were used to justify the
criminal money. Thus the money in the criminal’s account
appeared to be profits from stock transactions.
On the other hand, there were the losses, which had to be off-set.
For this purpose, the company used the account of a Jersey
limited company. Because of Jersey’s secrecy legislation the
identities of the beneficial owners of limited companies are hard
to discover. This particular Jersey limited company was the largest
of the company’s clients but performed no profitable business.
On several occasions, one of the directors of the company paid
large amounts of (criminal) money into its account; money which
off-set the losses.
Summarising, in this case the criminal (using other individuals)
paid for stock bills and turned a profit.
LESSON TO LEARN:
Without stringent controls, non-credit institutions are vulnerable
to criminal exploitation. Careful consideration should be made of
the fact that offshore companies can be used to off-set losses with
fake profits constituted by criminal assets.
CASE 11. A case involving Andorra: money laundering through
financial institutions
MAIN FEATURES:
Drug traffickers; person on whose behalf the transaction is
conducted; financial institutions; suspicious transaction reporting.
THE CASE:
In November 1998, information was exchanged with the Spanish
police concerning certain drug trafficking and money laundering
offences. Co-operation was boosted by contacts with Interpol
Washington, and a joint investigation by law enforcement
authorities revealed that a Spanish national had been
commissioned by a Colombian criminal organisation to launder
its cocaine trafficking proceeds. This person contacted the
managers of an Andorran firm, who facilitated the opening of
accounts in his name by local banks. The Spanish national made
payments in cash (USD, Spanish pesetas, German marks, Swiss
francs) into the drawing accounts opened and ordered banking
transfers to the United States and to Panama.
An Andorran bank filed a suspicious transaction report with the
local authorities because it considered the cash transfers to lack
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proper justification. Investigations ensued which led to the arrests
of the Spanish citizen (on money laundering charges) and of
members of the Colombian drug trafficking organisation, and to
the confiscation of 200 kg of cocaine. The Andorran bank
accounts tied to the crimes were frozen, thereby preventing any
further operations. Nevertheless, law enforcement authorities
estimated that 500 million pesetas had already been laundered.
LESSON TO LEARN:
It is essential to improve methods for identification of the actual
persons on whose behalf bank transactions are conducted.
CASE 12. A case involving Cyprus: money laundering through
offshore corporation
MAIN FEATURES:
Offshore companies; money laundering from Western European
countries in Cyprus.
THE CASE:
A report to the Cypriot Unit for Combating Money Laundering by
the Drug Law Enforcement Unit of the Police alleged suspicious
criminal activities involving an offshore company registered in
Cyprus, a number of Cypriots, and citizens of a Western
European country. The Cypriot authorities were informed by the
Customs Department that a Cypriot had imported a large amount
of cash in a foreign currency. This information, together with
further information concerning possible drug trafficking offences,
led to investigations which revealed the use of an offshore
company to launder drug proceeds. The Unit for Combating
Money Laundering conducted inquiries and obtained court
disclosure orders for information, finding that the offshore
company was registered in Cyprus and had stated that its main
business was “general trade”. In actual fact it was inactive and had
never undertaken any real transactions.
The suspects, in co-operation with other persons, transferred large
amounts of money in cash from a Western European country to
bank accounts in Cyprus. (The origin of this money is not yet
clear: apart from some insignificant amounts, the cash has already
been transferred abroad through various bank accounts.)
Investigations revealed that the money had been transferred to
Cyprus from a Western European country, and specifically from
companies registered in that country. The case is still under
investigation and the authorities of the Western European
country, the Cypriot Unit for Combating Money Laundering, and
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the Financial Crime Unit of the Police are co-operating closely to
trace the source of money.
Although no predicate offence has been discovered, it seems that
the money originates from drug trafficking. The Cypriot offshore
company used for the laundering has had its licence amended and
is currently under surveillance.
LESSON TO LEARN:
Company law in Western European countries and in offshore
jurisdictions must be scrutinised to determine the loopholes in
transparency liable to criminal exploitation.
CASE 13. A case involving Switzerland: money laundering
through banks
MAIN FEATURES:
Beneficial owner of corporations; use of bank accounts.
THE CASE:
A bank received a transfer of funds amounting to CHF 2,000,000
from overseas for one of its customers. Shortly afterwards, the
bank was informed by a major foreign bank that it has been the
victim of a fraud and that a complaint has been made to the police
in the overseas country. The individual named in the complaint
was a customer of the Swiss bank, which promptly asked for
assistance in gathering information. In the meantime, another
transfer of funds had been received, this time amounting to
approximately CHF 2,500,000. Some of the first deposit was
subsequently withdrawn in cash or transferred out of the account.
Shortly after receiving the second payment, the customer
instructed the bank to transfer the entire balance in the account to
a bank located in the Middle East. Asked as to the origin and
source of the money, the customer cited a transaction entirely
unconnected with his business. He promised to supply the
relevant contract documentation, which was never received by the
bank. The bank’s suspicions were consequently aroused and it
filed a report with the MROS. Inquiries by the latter concerning
the customer (a corporate body) at first uncovered little
information, but note was made of a beneficial owner who sought
to remain in the background. Further inquiries in Switzerland
revealed that this individual had already been implicated in a
separate money laundering investigation by Interpol. As a result of
enquiries sent to various other reporting offices in Europe and
elsewhere, it emerged that the individual in question was known to
the authorities in several countries and had been suspected of
drug trafficking on numerous occasions, but that there had never
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been sufficient evidence to bring charges against him. The MROS
sent the suspicious transaction report, together with the additional
information, to the prosecution authorities. The investigating
judge decided to commence a criminal investigation on the basis
of article 305bis of the penal code. The MROS continues to liaise
with the investigating judge in order to utilise information to the
best effect.
LESSON TO LEARN:
Efforts should be made to identify the real beneficial owners,
when a legal entity opens a bank account or conducts bank
transactions.
CASE 14. Three cases involving Hungary: money laundering
across borders through corporations
MAIN FEATURES:
Fraud; money laundering through company law schemes; role of
corporations in laundering money across borders.
THE CASES:
1. 100,000 USD originating from fraud committed in Riga were
deposited in the account of a Latvian company (linked to the
perpetrator of the fraud) and then transferred - through
corresponding banks - to the account of a Hungarian limited
company. The amount was kept in the account for a month.
After this the Hungarian manager, with the excuse of a failed
contract, transferred it to the account of a third company in
Lithuania, not to the account of the first company in Riga.
2. About 2.5 million USD originating from an investment fraud
committed in Austria were transferred to the account of a
Hungarian financial advising company. The Hungarian
managing director entered the sums as ‘capital reserve’ in the
company’s books. The Hungarian company made short term
deposits with the money and then, after the maturity dates,
transferred it to the account of a credit institution, at the same
time ordering the bank to facilitate investments on behalf of
the company. The money involved was secured during
investigations by freezing the accounts of the Hungarian
company.
3. The predicate crime in this case was an export subvention
fraud. One billion HUF was sent to the account of a company
in Liechtenstein as a ‘finder's fee’ or as ‘propaganda expenses’.
Investigations found that only 300 million HUF (1.5 million
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USD) had been laundered and no information was
forthcoming as to the owner of the money.
LESSON TO LEARN:
Corporations are used to launder money in Eastern European
countries as well. The behaviour of corporations should be
carefully monitored. Required in particular are the close scrutiny
of corporate financial statements and the introduction of stringent
auditing rules in all jurisdictions.
CASE 15. Two cases involving Poland: corporations as a shield for
money laundering; money laundering through financial and non-
financial institutions
MAIN FEATURES:
Offshore companies; false invoices; exchange offices.
THE CASES:
1. Use of the bank accounts of a fictitious company. A company
was registered on the Registry of Commercial Activities
although it did not actually engage in any form of business. It
purchased fictitious goods (i.e. electronic equipment) and
issued false invoices for payment with dirty money.
2. Use of exchange offices. The owner of an exchange office
traded lump sums of foreign currencies without proper
bookkeeping. He also overstated the number of daily
transactions in order to conceal the criminal origin of money.
LESSON TO LEARN:
In Eastern Europe, too, corporations are used as shields to
conceal the real identities of the persons on whose behalf
transactions are conducted. Exchange offices should be subjected
to the same identification requirements as financial institutions.
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13. The Euroshore
project’s
recommendations for EU
action
The purpose of the recommendations set out below is to protect
the EU financial system against exploitation of financial centres
and offshore facilities by organised crime. Resulting directly from
the foregoing analysis of the criminal, administrative, banking,
company and judicial co-operation regulatory systems of offshore
countries, these recommendations spring from asymmetries in the
levels of deviation from the integrity standards (general and EU
level) intended to protect financial systems against infiltration by
organised crime. The recommendations are underpinned by two
principal assumptions. Although already discussed in Section 7,
these assumptions are stated once again, for they are essential for
a proper understanding of the criteria used to draw up the
recommendations that follow.
The first assumption is that asymmetries in the transparency of
financial transactions between EU countries and other financial
centres and offshore jurisdictions heighten the risk that the latter
will be exploited by organised crime groups. That is to say, the
tighter bank secrecy becomes and the greater the anonymity of
the ultimate beneficial owner, the more criminals are able to
launder the proceeds of crime and re-invest them in Europe, and
the more the risk diminishes that such proceeds will be traced and
confiscated, and the criminal organisation concerned disrupted.
Accordingly, the risk of exploitation is a function of asymmetries
in regulation.
The integrity standards are the standards set for:
- criminal and criminal procedure laws;
- administrative regulations;
- banking law;
- company law;
- international co-operation.
In other words, the less criminal law and criminal procedure are
effectively enforced, the more the customers on whose behalf
accounts are opened or transactions conducted enjoy anonymity,
the more stringently bank secrecy is applied, the less company law
is transparent, and the less international co-operation is afforded
by offshore jurisdictions, the greater become the opportunities to
launder the proceeds of crime and re-invest them in the EU
financial system and the less the likelihood that such proceeds will
be traced and confiscated and the criminal organisation concerned
disrupted.
The second assumption is that, as the risk of exploitation of
financial centres and offshore jurisdictions increases, so the
protection of the EU financial system and other financial systems
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diminishes; protection, that is, against pollution by the proceeds
of crime which pass through financial and offshore centres, enter
the EU financial system, and distort competition among
legitimate EU enterprises.
This means that protection of the EU financial system is a
function of the risk of exploitation.
Combining the two functions yields the overall assumption that
protection of the EU financial system is determined by the
regulatory asymmetries between the EU countries and offshore
jurisdictions.
As a consequence of the two assumptions just stated, and in the
light of the results of the analysis reported in section 10, the
recommendations that follow are intended to enhance the
integrity of EU countries and to reduce the key asymmetries that
hamper international co-operation and potentially pollute
European financial markets as they now pollute the global
financial markets.
It is proposed that the European Union should take action at
three different levels in order to protect its financial system:
1. harmonising and raising, when necessary, the level of
regulation among EU member states (harmonisation);
2. exporting the standards thus achieved by the EU member
states to financial and offshore centres (active protection -
reduction of asymmetries), the purpose being to reduce the
asymmetries between the regulatory systems in financial
centres and offshore jurisdictions and those in the EU
member states;
3. preventing EU financial mechanisms (financial and non-
financial institutions) from receiving financial transactions
originating from financial and offshore centres outside the
EU unless they meet the level of regulation of the EU
member states (passive protection - exclusion), the purpose being
to prevent pollution of the EU financial system.
It is to be understood that action 3 (exclusion) may be implemented when
action 2 does not achieve the desired effect (reduction of asymmetries) and may
perform the dual function of defending the EU financial system against
pollution by dirty money and providing an incentive for financial and offshore
centres to adopt the standards of regulation set by the international
community. This would also enhance the effect of action 2.
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This report’s recommendations are as follows:
1. The introduction of an ‘all crimes’ anti-money laundering legislation is
recommended, accompanied at the same time by a well-defined list of
predicate offences to be included as distinct crimes in each jurisdiction.
2. The enactment in other jurisdictions of money laundering legislation
consistent with the standards set by the EU Money Laundering
Directive, as amended.
3. The introduction of the liability of corporations, either administrative
(short term) or criminal (long term), as a generic sanction on crimes
committed by corporations.
4. The requirement that EU financial institutions accepting transactions
from countries outside the EU must impose the disclosure – together
with the name of the person ordering the transaction – of the names of
the director of the corporation and of the trustee, together with those of
the ultimate beneficial owner (i.e. main shareholder) of the corporation
itself and of the beneficiary and settlor of a trust. If the EU institution
fails to require this disclosure, it should be subjected to sanction.
5. Exploration of the feasibility of establishing a system of incentives for
credit and financial institutions (from minimum measures of
involvement intended to show these institutions the concrete results of
their anti-money laundering action, to maximum measures consisting in
economic rewards when reporting has been essential for the conviction
of criminals and/or confiscation of criminal assets), the purpose being to
enhance and give greater effectiveness to co-operation between credit
and financial institutions and law enforcement authorities.
6. Examination of the feasibility of eliminating the issuance of bearer shares
and of eliminating nominee shareholders; of setting minimum capital
requirements for the incorporation of companies; of mandating the
drafting and depositing of audited financial statements; of creating public
registers of companies. Examination of these possibilities is especially
recommended as regards companies located in financial and offshore
centres with a view to preventing the use of companies as vehicles for
money laundering. This recommendation, if implemented, would assist
in ascertaining the real identities of the persons on whose behalf financial
transactions are conducted, and it is therefore closely connected with
recommendation no. 4.
7. The introduction of certain minimum requirements, such as the
registration of trust deeds and disclosure of the identities of the settlor
and the beneficiary, for the purpose of enhancing transparency in trust
law. This recommendation, if implemented, would assist in ascertaining
the identities of the persons on whose behalf transactions are conducted
and is therefore closely connected with recommendations no. 4.
These recommendations are discussed in detail in the following
Sections (13.1/2/3) and according to the following criteria,
which are arranged in logical sequence:
- the problems: to wit, the asymmetries in regulation analysed
by this research;
- the background and rationale (discussion of where and when
similar solutions have been already recommended and
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explanation of why the recommendations should be
implemented);
- the aim;
- the remedy proposed;
- implementation of each of the three forms of action proposed
(harmonisation, reduction of the asymmetries and exclusion)
for the EU institutions. Practical implementation of these
actions is tailored to each of the four groups of countries
analysed.
The recommendations have been grouped according to the sector
of regulation considered (criminal and criminal procedure law,
administrative law, company law, banking law, international co-
operation).
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 13.1 Criminal law asymmetries and connected recommendations
1.
ASYMMETRY
Differences among the types of crime considered to be money
laundering predicate offences.
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
The international community has introduced provisions with
regard to the predicate offences of money laundering. While the
Vienna Convention approach was limited to the laundering of the
proceeds of drug offences, the trend is towards an ever-wider
coverage. The FATF in its Recommendation no. 458 and the ‘Joint
Action adopted by the Council on the basis of art. K.3 of the
Treaty on European Union on the Laundering, Search, Seizure
and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime’59 have pressed for the
introduction of ‘serious crimes’ anti-money laundering legislation,
while Council of Europe Convention 1990/141 defines predicate
offences as “any criminal offence as a result of which proceeds were
generated”.60 Even though the above Joint Action defines ‘serious
offences’, differences in national criminal codes mean that the
precise coverage of criminal activity will not be the same. One of
the reasons for moving to an ‘all crimes’ approach is therefore the
fact that any two countries will tend to have a different
conception of what constitutes ‘serious crime’. This will lead them
to envisage different crimes as money laundering predicate
offences, thus making international police and judicial co-
operation more difficult, insofar as the application of the principle
of dual criminality may give rise to practical difficulties. It is
therefore preferable to adopt the option of an ‘all crimes’
legislation. However, even this does not by itself solve all the
problems of international co-operation.
An example could be useful for a better understanding of the
problems arising, even under an ‘all crimes’ approach. One may
consider two countries, A and B, both of which have adopted an
‘all crimes’ legislation. Country A foresees trafficking of human
beings as a crime, while country B does not provide for this
particular offence in its criminal code. In the event of a request
for co-operation, concerning the laundering of proceeds from
trafficking of human beings, by country A to country B, the
former would most probably see its request rejected.
Notwithstanding the fact that both countries have an ‘all crimes’
                                                
58 "Each country should take such measures as may be necessary, including legislative ones, to enable it
to criminalise money laundering as set forth in the Vienna Convention. Each country should extend the
offence of drug money laundering to one based on serious offences. Each country would determine which
serious offences would be designated as money laundering predicate offences".
59 Joint Action of 3 December 1998 on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of
the Proceeds of Crime, 98/699/JHA.
60 See Articles 1 and 6, Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure
and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, n. 141, 1990.
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legislation, a difference in the conduct considered as criminal
would hamper international co-operation.
Therefore, in order to facilitate and accelerate international
judicial co-operation, this recommendation proposes the adoption
of an ‘all crimes’ legislation, but goes beyond this, calling for
certain crimes to be included in the criminal systems of all
jurisdictions, with the consequence that mutual legal assistance
should always be granted for these offences.
AIM
To increase the consistency of anti-money laundering legislation
among all jurisdictions, and to improve international police and
judicial co-operation in the area of money laundering, thereby
avoiding the possibility that co-operation may be refused on the
grounds that a crime is not included in the criminal system of the
jurisdiction receiving a request for co-operation (assistance or
extradition).
REMEDY
The introduction of an ‘all crimes’ legislation, combined with the
condition that a number of criminal offences be foreseen in all
jurisdictions. Such criminal conducts should consist of at least
those crimes envisaged for inclusion in the forthcoming UN
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Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,61 with the
addition of more specific crimes, among which those falling
within the category of tax fraud, such as ‘falsification of
documents for tax purposes’.
                                                
61 According to footnote 3 to article 2 of the draft UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, a list of offences (either indicative or exhaustive) could
be included either in an annex or in the travaux preparatoires. The attachment to the
revised draft of the Convention (doc. A/AC.254/4/rev.4) contains the following list of
serious crimes proposed by Mexico on behalf of several delegations:
- Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;
- [money laundering];
- traffic in persons, in particular women and children;
- illicit traffic in and transport of migrants;
- counterfeiting currency;
- illicit traffic in or stealing of cultural objects;
- illicit traffic in or stealing of nuclear material, its use or threatening
to misuse it;
- acts of terrorism;
- illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition,
explosives and other related material;
- illicit traffic in or stealing of motor vehicles, their parts and
components;
- acts of corruption;
- illicit traffic in human organs;
- illicit access to or illicit use of computer system and electronic
equipment, including electronic transfer of funds;
- kidnapping;
- illicit traffic in or stealing of biological and genetic material.
We have added to this list those crimes that seem relevant to this recommendation. A
possible list might therefore include the following:
- active and passive corruption and international corruption;
- human smuggling/trafficking;
- embezzlement;
- extortion;
- falsification of documents for tax purposes;
- fraud;
- illegal gambling;
- participation in a criminal organisation;
- racketeering.
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ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS
Harmonisation and
Reduction of the
asymmetries
Exclusion
Addressed
Group
Methods of implementation Methods of implementation
Group 0 Use the framework decision of
the EU Treaty as amended (art.
34, 2b).
Group 1 Assess the use of one or more
of the various legal frameworks
which connect the European
Union with countries in Group
1 (i.e. using part Four of EC
Treaty and Annex II to EC
Treaty with the Overseas
Territories and exploring the
feasibility of including this issue
in the review of Association
Agreements to be made by the
Council by February 2000).
Group 2 Encourage Group 2 countries
to adopt an ‘all crimes’
legislation, accepting the
proposal to establish a number
of types of conduct as distinct
crimes in their criminal system,
patterned on those foreseen in
Group 0 countries and consider
it as a condition for their entry
into the European Union.
Group 3 Use the partnership and co-
operation agreements between
the EU and third countries (arts.
38 and 24 EU Treaty as
amended). Proposal to be also
submitted to the international
fora in which the European
Union is represented (FATF,
others).
Not applicable.
RECOMMENDATION 1
Considering that:
- differences in the range and types of activity considered as crimes
in financial and offshore centres and in the member states of the
European Union hamper international co-operation in the area of
criminal law;
the introduction of an ‘all crimes’ anti-money laundering legislation is
recommended, accompanied at the same time by a well-defined list of
predicate offences to be included as distinct crimes in each
jurisdiction.
Euroshore
105
2.
ASYMMETRY
Difference among the types of subjects covered by anti-money
laundering legislation (such as identification requirements and
suspicious transactions reporting). This asymmetry will increase
even further when the proposed amendments to the EU Money
Laundering Directive come into force.
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
Analysis of cases throughout the world shows that professionals
and non-financial institutions are increasingly involved in money
laundering operations.62 Action should be taken to reverse this
trend by monitoring the activities of these professionals and
institutions. The effectiveness of the new obligations introduced
by the amendments to the Directive, however, depends on the
sanctions imposed in cases of misconduct (sanctions which, for
professionals, are suspension, disqualification, confiscation).
European Directive 91/308 states in Article 12 that Member
States may stipulate that professional activities and categories
other than credit and financial institutions are subject to the
obligations imposed by the Directive, if they conduct business
particularly at risk of money laundering.
AIM
To increase the transparency of financial transactions, to prevent
the misuse of office/trust accounts (by professionals), and to
deter the use of non-financial businesses for money laundering
purposes.
REMEDY
Extension of identification and reporting obligations to non-
financial businesses and professionals to create a system of
sanctions which are deterrent, effective and proportionate for
those who do not comply.
                                                
62 Article 2a of the Proposal for an European Directive amending Council Directive
91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991, lists the following professional categories:
- external accountants and auditors;
- real estate agents;
- notaries and other independent legal professionals when assisting or representing
clients in respect of the: buying and selling of real property or business entities;
handling of client money, securities or other assets; opening or managing bank,
savings or securities accounts; creation, operation or management of companies,
trusts or similar structures; execution of any other financial transaction;
- dealers in high-value goods, such as precious stones or metals;
- transporters of funds;
- the operators, owners and managers of casinos.
Euroshore
106
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS
Harmonisation and reduction
of the asymmetries
Exclusion
Addressed
Group
Methods of implementation Methods of implementation
Group 0 Implemented by the
amendments to Money
Laundering Directive 91/308
presented by the Commission
(14.7.99). Assessment of the
instruments comprised in the 1st
and 3rd pillars as possible
administrative and criminal
sanctions.
Group 1 Assessment of the use of one or
more of the various legal
frameworks which connect the
European Union with countries
in Group 1 to induce them to
adopt the obligations imposed
by EU Directive in their own
legislative systems.
Group 2 Encourage Group 2 countries
to comply with the EU criteria
and consider such compliance
as a condition for their entry to
the European Union.
Group 3 Use the partnership and co-
operation agreements between
the EU and third countries (arts.
38 and 24 EU Treaty as
amended).
Proposal to be submitted to the
international fora in which the
European Union is represented
(FATF, others).
Not applicable.
RECOMMENDATION 2
Considering that:
- there is an increasing tendency for professionals and non-financial
businesses to be used in money laundering operations;
- once the amendments to the money laundering Directive have
been enacted, the asymmetries already existing between EU
member countries and countries outside the Union in relation to
the categories to which money laundering obligations are applied
will increase in magnitude;
it is recommended that money laundering legislation consistent with
the standards set out in the EU Money Laundering Directive be
enacted in other jurisdictions.
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3.
ASYMMETRY
Differences among jurisdictions as regards corporate liability.
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
International institutions agree that the liability of corporations is
an effective means to combat organised crime, money laundering
and other economic crimes. The international community, and
the European Union in particular, have requested through various
international instruments that such liability be introduced.
Moreover, the Revised draft UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime provides for the establishment of
corporate liability.63 Such action, however, has been limited in its
scope, insofar as it has been addressed to separate and specific
crimes, such as organised crime, money laundering, fraud and
active corruption. Furthermore, numerous acts of the European
Union envisage the introduction of forms of liability. See, for
instance:
- Joint Action of 21 December 1998 (98/733/JHA) adopted by
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on
European Union, on making it a criminal offence to
participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of
the European Union. Art. 3 of this Joint Action stipulates:
"Each Member State shall verify that legal persons may be held
criminally, or failing that, otherwise liable for offences referred to in
Article 2 which are committed by that legal person, in accordance with
procedures to be laid down in national law. Such liability of the legal
person shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural
persons who were the perpetrators of the offences or their accomplices.
Each Member State shall ensure, in particular, that legal persons may be
penalised in an effective, proportionate and dissuasive manner and that
material and economic sanctions may be imposed on them".
Recommendation no. 3 is not restricted to types of conduct
committed by criminal organisations within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Joint Action mentioned;
- Joint Action of 24 February 1997 (97/174/JHA) adopted by
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on
European Union concerning action to combat trafficking in
human beings and sexual exploitation of children;
                                                
63 Revised draft UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, article 5: “Each
State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, consistent with its legal principles, to establish
the liability of legal persons for participation in serious crimes involving an organized crime group and
for the offences established in articles 3 and 4 of this Convention. Subject to the legal principles of the
State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative. Such liability shall be
incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have committed the
offences. Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with
this article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions,
including monetary sanctions”.
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- Second Protocol, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the
Treaty on European Union, to the Convention on the
protection of the European Communities’ financial interests.64
This Recommendation no. 3 goes further than the Protocol,
which only obliges Member States to take the measures
necessary to ensure that legal persons are made liable for
fraud, active corruption and money laundering. The nature of
the liability is not prescribed (as either administrative or
criminal).
- Art. 14 of the Corpus Juris.65 This disposition provides for the
criminal liability of legal persons found to have committed an
offence of fraud against the Community budget as set out in
the articles 1 – 8 of the Corpus Juris.
Besides the fact that these instruments leave the decision of
whether or not to implement administrative or criminal corporate
liability to the individual country concerned, the issue of
introducing corporate criminal liability in each jurisdiction has not
yet been subject to single and comprehensive action, and
therefore warrants particular attention.
Only a certain number of the member states of the European
Union have introduced the administrative and/or criminal liability
of legal persons: for instance, France, Ireland, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. By contrast, countries like Greece and
Italy do not have the legal means to impose liability on legal
persons. Consequently, the criminal and administrative liability of
legal persons is admitted not only in the common law countries
but also in some of those of the continental legal tradition.
Recommendation no. 3 intends to make this obligation binding
on all the Member States, at least as regards all the crimes
contained in the fixed list, as stated in Recommendation no. 1.
The conclusion to be drawn is that the Recommendation
introduces a broader range of criminal offences for which legal
persons would be held liable, either administratively or, in the
longer term, criminally.
AIM
To increase the responsibility of corporations in regard to money
laundering by imposing criminal and/or administrative sanctions
on them able to affect their reputations through systems of
shaming.
                                                
64 Brussels, 19 June 1995.
65 See Corpus Juris. Introducing Penal Provisions for the Purposes of the Financial Interests of the
European Union, Economica, Paris, 1997.
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REMEDY
To introduce the liability of corporations, either administrative
(short term) or criminal (long term), as a generic sanction applied
in cases of crimes committed by corporations.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS
Harmonisation and reduction
of the asymmetries
Exclusion
Addressed
Group
Methods of implementation Methods of implementation
Group 0 Use the framework decision of
EU Treaty as amended (art. 34,
2b).
Group 1 Assess the use of one or more
of the different legal
frameworks which connect the
European Union with countries
in Group 1 to persuade them to
adopt corporate liability, either
administrative or criminal, in
their legislative systems.
Group 2 Encourage Group 2 countries
to introduce corporate criminal
liability in their legislative
systems in line with the contents
used toward Group 0 countries
and consider it a condition for
entry to the European Union.
Group 3 Use the partnership and co-
operation agreements between
the EU and third countries (arts.
38 and 24 EU Treaty as
amended).
Push for the adoption of all the
international instruments in
which corporate liability is
foreseen.
Not applicable.
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RECOMMENDATION 3
Considering that:
- corporations are used for criminal purposes (fraud, money
laundering, corruption, etc.);
- the legislative systems of many countries in the world do not
foresee corporate criminal liability;
- personal criminal liability does not hold the management and the
corporation itself responsible, since responsibility attaches only to
a single employee or straw-man;
- corporate criminal liability may have a deterrent effect insofar as
the criminal sanction imposed on a financial institution damages
its reputation and consequently induces the management to feel
more accountable for acts committed within the institution;
it is recommended that corporate liability, either administrative (short
term) or criminal (long term), be introduced as a generic sanction
applied in the case of crimes committed by a corporation.
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 13.2 Banking law and administrative regulations asymmetries and connected
recommendations
4.
ASYMMETRY
Different levels of effectiveness displayed by the anti-money
laundering identification requirements among jurisdictions, in
particular when transactions are conducted on behalf of legal
entities.
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
FATF Recommendation no. 10 states that: “In order to fulfil
identification requirements concerning legal entities, financial institutions
should, when necessary, take measures: (i) to verify the legal existence and
structure of the customer by obtaining, either from a public register or from the
customer or both, proof of incorporation, including information concerning the
customer’s name, legal form, address, directors and provisions regulating the
power to bind the entity; (ii) to verify that any person purporting to act on
behalf of the customer is so authorised and identify that person”. Moreover,
FATF Recommendation no. 21 adds: “Financial institutions should
give special attention to business relations and transactions with persons,
including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not or
insufficiently apply these Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have
no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and purpose
should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing,
and be available to help supervisors, auditors and law enforcement agencies”.
If doubt arises as to whether a customer is opening an account or
carrying out a transaction on his/her own behalf, identification
requirements make it possible to ascertain the identity of the
person on whose behalf the account is opened or the transaction
conducted. In financial and offshore centres, this requirement is
often circumvented by the existence of corporate confidentiality.
Although the data provided by these countries confirm that, in
the vast majority of cases, the law provides for the identification
of the person or the entity on whose behalf an account is opened
or a transaction conducted, this requirement does not always
ensure a sufficient level of transparency. This comes about when
transactions are conducted on behalf of certain kinds of
corporations or trusts established according to company or trust
law, which in many jurisdictions allow a high degree of anonymity
for the persons who control them. In this case, it is not possible
to disclose the identity of the person on whose behalf an account
is opened or a transaction conducted. Consequently, the opacity
of company or trust laws may restrict the possibility for disclosure
of the real identity of the person on whose behalf an operation is
conducted and who effectively controls the corporation or trust.
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To prevent this problem from arising, concerted action in the area
of banking, company and trust law is required. As regards banking
law in particular, identification of the real identity of the person
on whose behalf a transaction is conducted is essential, and in the
case of a corporation or a trust, also the name/s of the director/s
and trustee/s. Only in this way can the ‘know your customer’
clause be properly applied to financial transactions.
This recommendation is therefore of central importance insofar
as it applies not only to banking law but also, and especially, to
company and criminal law.
AIM
To improve the tracing of the movements of the proceeds of
crime and increase their confiscation by virtue of more
straightforward identification of the real owners of criminal
assets.
REMEDY
Mandate the furnishing of additional information to EU banks
and financial institutions when they receive transactions from
banks and financial institutions located in financial/offshore
jurisdictions. In particular, recipient banks and financial
institutions in EU Member States should require the ordering
banks to disclose - together with name of the person ordering the
transaction – the name of the director of the corporation/the
trustee together with those of the ultimate beneficial owner (i.e.
main shareholder) of the corporation itself/the beneficiary of the
trust.
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ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS
Harmonisation and
reduction of the
asymmetries
Exclusion
Addressed
group
Methods of implementation Methods of implementation
Group 0
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Recipient banks and financial
institutions in EU Member
States should require ordering
banks to disclose – together
with name of the person
ordering the transaction – the
names of the director of the
corporation and of the trustee,
together with those of the
ultimate beneficial owner (i.e.
main shareholder) of the
corporation itself and of the
beneficiary and settlor of a trust.
If a EU institution fails to
require this disclosure, it should
be subject to a sanction.
When such disclosure is not
forthcoming, the EU institution
should not proceed with the
transaction. If the transaction is
nonetheless performed in the
EU jurisdiction, a penalty
established by a EU framework
decision should be imposed on
the EU institution.
To facilitate implementation of
this provision, the following
actions should be considered:
- draw up, at the European
Union level, a “positive
list” of countries for which
controls are not necessary;
- consider the feasibility of
introducing a threshold;
- above which disclosure of
such information should be
mandatory.
This procedure could be made
more efficient by creating a
“negative list” of banks
forbidden to operate within the
EU.
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RECOMMENDATION 4
Considering that:
- the disclosure of the real identities of the persons on whose behalf
transactions are conducted is essential for the tracing and
confiscation of the proceeds of crime;
- different levels of transparency in bank transactions between
countries impede discovery of the real identities of the persons on
whose behalf accounts are opened or transactions conducted in
certain jurisdictions;
- the majority of financial and offshore centres do not require
disclosure of the identities of the persons on whose behalf
accounts are opened or transactions conducted, so that when
accounts are held in the names of corporations, trusts or
professionals acting on behalf of their clients, the identities of the
ultimate beneficial owners are unknown;
EU financial institutions accepting transactions from countries
outside the EU should require the disclosure - together with the name
of the person ordering the transaction - of the name of the director of
the corporation and of the trustee, together with those of the ultimate
beneficial owner (i.e. main shareholder) of the corporation itself and
of the beneficiary and settlor of a trust. If a EU institution fails to
require such disclosure, it should be subject to a sanction.
Euroshore
115
5.
ASYMMETRY
Different levels of co-operation by credit and financial institutions
in reporting suspicious transactions.
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
The maximum level of co-operation by credit and financial
institutions in the reporting of suspicious transactions is essential.
This co-operation is frequently not forthcoming, and there is a
growing risk of ‘ritualism’ in anti-money laundering control. The
fostering of diligent anti-money laundering action by these
institutions would increase the level of mutual trust between them
and law enforcement authorities.
AIM
To enhance and give greater effectiveness to co-operation
between credit and financial institutions and law enforcement
authorities.
REMEDY
Establishment of a system of incentives for credit and financial
institutions intended to encourage their co-operation with anti-
money laundering operations. These incentives could take various
forms:
- measures for the continuing involvement of co-operating
agencies in anti-money laundering action and in the
prosecutions to which they have contributed;
- economic rewards when the reporting has been essential for
the conviction of criminals and/or confiscation of their assets.
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ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS
Harmonisation and reduction
of the asymmetries
Exclusion
Addressed
group
Methods of implementation Methods of implementation
Group 0 Assess - in the context of the 3rd
pillar of the EU Treaty - the
feasibility of awarding a
percentage of the value of the
assets confiscated to the credit
and financial institutions which
reported as suspicious the
transaction which led to the
detection and investigation of
money laundering and to the
final related confiscation.
At a lower level, action to
encourage the involvement of
credit and financial institutions,
exploring methods to inform
them on the concrete or
potential results of their anti-
money laundering action.
Group 1 Assess the use of one or more
of the legal frameworks which
link the European Union with
countries in Group 1 to induce
their consideration of the above
mentioned proposal on systems
of incentives for financial
institutions.
Group 2 Invite Group 2 countries to
examine the feasibility of
enforcing the above mentioned
proposal on systems of
incentives for financial
institutions and to consider it a
condition for entry to the
European Union.
Group 3 Use the partnership and co-
operation agreements between
the EU and third countries (arts.
38 and 24 EC Treaty).
Proposal to be submitted to the
international fora in which the
European Union is represented
(FATF, others).
Not applicable.
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RECOMMENDATION 5
Considering that:
- there are different levels of co-operation by credit and financial
institutions in the reporting of suspicious transactions;
- co-operation by credit and financial institutions is essential for the
detection of money laundering and the confiscation of criminal
proceeds;
- international assets sharing provisions regard mainly law
enforcement agencies and exclude financial mechanisms;
it is recommended that assessment should be made of the feasibility
of establishing a system of incentives for credit and financial
institutions (from minimum measures of involvement intended to
show these institutions the concrete results of their anti-money
laundering action to maximum measures consisting in economic
rewards when reporting has been essential for the conviction of
criminals and/or the confiscation of criminal assets) for the purpose
of enhancing and giving greater effectiveness to co-operation between
credit and financial institutions and law enforcement authorities.
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 13.3 Company law asymmetries and connected recommendations
 
6.
ASYMMETRY
Differences among EU countries themselves and between EU
countries and financial/offshore centres in the criteria applied to
the establishment and operation of corporations, among which:
a) the issuing of bearer shares;
b) the allowing of nominee shareholders;
c) the fixing of minimum capital requirements for the
incorporation of a company;
d) the drafting and lodging of audited financial statements;
e) the existence of a public register of companies.
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
Corporations throughout the world are used to launder money,
and the more company law is opaque, the greater the use made of
corporations, given that it is almost impossible to identify the
person or persons who effectively control them. This is especially
the case when a bank account is run by a corporation set up with
non-transparent standards. In order to deal with this problem,
steps should be taken to harmonise and give the greatest
transparency possible to EU company law standards and then to
export these standards outside the EU.
This recommendation has an essential bearing on achievement of
a global anti-money laundering strategy, for only if a sufficient
degree of transparency is achieved in company law will it be
possible to accomplish complete identification of the persons
conducting financial transactions. In other words, opacity in
company law may exert a ‘domino’ effect on other sectors of
regulation geared to overall integrity of a given financial system.
In this context, transparency should be understood as that which
assists law enforcement activity by furnishing a more easily
detectable paper trail. Accomplishing this transparency would also
mean increasing the likelihood of better international law
enforcement and judicial co-operation.
Substantiating the key significance of this recommendation is the
existence of similar ones, for instance FATF Recommendation
no. 25, which states more generically: “Countries should take notice of
the potential for abuse of shell corporations by money launderers and should
consider whether additional measures are required to prevent unlawful use of
such entities”.
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AIM
To set up minimum standards of corporate transparency, prevent
the use of companies as vehicles for money laundering (in that
they shield the identities of real beneficial owners), facilitate the
investigation of money laundering cases, and lay a better basis for
co-operation among law enforcement/judicial authorities across
countries.
REMEDY
Eliminate the possibility of issuing bearer shares; eliminate the
possibility of having nominee shareholders; impose minimum
capital requirements for the incorporation of companies; require
the drafting and depositing of audited financial statements;
require the creation of a public register of companies.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS
Harmonisation and reduction
of the asymmetries
Exclusion
Addressed
group
Methods of implementation Methods of implementation
Group 0 Assess the most effective
instruments (i.e. Directives) with
which to harmonise, among the
EU member states, the criteria
regulating the setting up of
corporations (among which the
impossibility of issuing bearer
shares; the impossibility of
having nominee shareholders;
minimum capital requirements
on incorporation of a company;
the obligation to draft and
deposit audited financial
statements).
Group 1 To use the co-operation
frameworks developed within the
Community in order to apply
pressure on Group 1 to bring
their company standards into line
with the above mentioned
criteria.
Group 2 To make Group 2 countries
comply with the above
mentioned criteria, persuading
them to bring their legislation
into line with them as a
condition for entry to the Union.
Group 3 Act through international fora or
use the partnership and co-
operation agreements between
the EU and third countries (arts.
38 and 24 EC Treaty).
Assess the feasibility of
creating a ‘negative list’ of
countries which do not
meet the established EU
standards of company law.
The European Investment
Bank would not grant
loans to countries on the
list.
Assess the feasibility of
creating an EU central
authority to supervise
corporations and a register
of corporations operating
within the EU financial
system which comply with
EU requested standards.
Only corporations listed
on the register would be
allowed to do business in
the EU. Such action would
enhance trust within the
EU market and also
reduce the risk of fraud.
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RECOMMENDATION 6
Considering that:
- there are differences among EU countries and financial and
offshore centres in the criteria applied to regulate the setting up
and operation of corporations and more generally among
standards of transparency in company law;
- the low standards of transparency in company law in financial and
offshore centres render them attractive to money launderers
wishing to set up offshore corporations;
- it is recommended that assessment should be made of:
- the feasibility of eliminating the issuance of bearer shares and the
existence of nominee shareholders;
- the feasibility of imposing minimum capital requirements for
incorporation of a company;
- the feasibility of requiring the drafting and depositing of audited
financial statements;
- the feasibility of creating public registers of companies.
This assessment is especially recommended in regard to companies
located in financial and offshore centres with a view to preventing the
use of companies as vehicles for money laundering. This
recommendation, if implemented, would assist in ascertaining the real
identities of the persons on whose behalf financial transactions are
conducted, and it is therefore connected to recommendation no. 4.
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7.
ASYMMETRY
Differences in the regulation of trusts, given that in some
jurisdictions the identities of the settlor and the beneficiary may
remain unknown.
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE
In jurisdictions in which trust regulations allow for the anonymity
of settlors and beneficiaries, trusts are misused for money
laundering purposes. The establishment and dissemination of
coherent and transparent rules governing trusts is therefore
essential.
AIM
To impose minimum standards of transparency on trusts, prevent
their use as vehicles for money laundering (in that they shield the
real identities of the criminals who control them), facilitate the
investigation of money laundering cases, and lay a better basis for
co-operation among law enforcement/judicial authorities across
countries.
REMEDY
Mandating registration of trust deeds and disclosure of the
identities of the settlor and the beneficiary.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS
Harmonisation and reduction
of the asymmetries
Exclusion
Addressed
group
Methods of implementation Methods of implementation
Group 0 Assess and introduce the most
effective instruments within the
Community to ensure
transparency in the matter of
trust law (with special regard to
registration of trust deeds and
disclosure of the identities of the
settlor and the beneficiary).
Group 1 Use the co-operation
frameworks developed within the
Community to apply pressure on
Group 1 to introduce and follow
best practices in the matter of
trust law (with special regard to
registration of trust deeds and
disclosure of the identities of the
settlor and the beneficiary).
Group 2
Group 3 Proposal to be submitted to
international fora in which
European Union is represented
(FATF, others).
Draw up a black (negative)
list of countries which do
not meet transparency
standards in their trust
laws (i.e., which do not
register trust deeds and
cannot disclose the
identities of the settlor and
the beneficiary).
The European Investment
Bank would not grant
loans to countries on the
list.
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RECOMMENDATION N. 7
Considering that:
- trust law in many financial and offshore centres renders
identification of the beneficiary and the settlor impossible;
- trusts are exploited in many jurisdictions as vehicles for money
laundering by being used to shield the identities of the criminals
who effectively control them;
it is recommended that specific requirements, such as the registration
of trust deeds and disclosure of the identities of the settlor and the
beneficiary, be introduced to enhance the transparency of trust law.
This recommendation, if implemented, would assist in ascertaining
the identities of the persons on whose behalf transactions are
conducted, and it is therefore closely connected to recommendation 4.
